المؤلفون: Nouveau, Patricia

المصدر: urn:isbn:978180037262
EU Industrial Policy in the Multipolar Economy (2022)

مصطلحات موضوعية: EU industrial policy, EU innovation policy, digital transformation, United-States, China, International Political Economy, Business & economic sciences, Law, criminology & political science, Political science, public administration & international relations, Sciences économiques & de gestion, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques, Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales

الوصف: The increasingly pervasive importance of computer and digital industries in all stages of the economy has revealed Europe’s growing reliance on foreign technologies. Twenty years ago, the EU considered US first-mover advantage in Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) a sectoral competitiveness issue. In the intervening years, China has been the sole economy to significantly demonstrate an ability to challenge US high-tech dominance, notwithstanding the existence of niche players in the rest of Asia and Europe. In this period, digital industries have unleashed an extended range of general-purpose and dual-use applications, needing key hardware and software inputs that are better-served or only served by US and Chinese firms. EU overreliance on ICT imports has shifted from being a sectoral issue to a cross-sectoral one, spanning from the provision of digital services and goods to the consumer (Business-to-Consumer), progressively extending to businesses (Business-to-Business), and currently heading towards the digitalization of everything — objects and processes. It strongly calls into question the capacity of European traditional industries to retain control and reap the full benefits of their now necessary digital transformation. It also casts doubt on the EU’s ability to provide — if necessary — secured and autonomous digital supply chains reliant on homegrown industries. This debate over Europe’s digital dependency has gained momentum since the mid-2010s and the deterioration of US-China relations. Over the last few years, China and the US have set a series of policy goals aiming at localizing strategic layers of the digital supply chain on their respective territory and therefore at “decoupling” their tightly interwoven production networks. Beyond the search on both sides for increased industrial self-sufficiency and leadership, the Trump administration has also justified this decoupling in terms of the national security threat posed by collaborations with Chinese companies and experts. In doing so, the US administration clearly expressed its willingness to see Europe as a political ally and as an economic partner taking the same stance and cutting industrial ties with strategic Chinese suppliers such as Huawei. The EU’s inability to develop strong European digital capabilities compromises the ability of EU Member States to make autonomous choices in terms of digital policies and supplies, with potentially far-reaching consequences for foreign policy, security, and military affairs. Against this backdrop, some key European decision-makers and stakeholders, including the European Commission (Commission) itself, have increasingly invoked notions of “strategic autonomy” and “digital sovereignty.” From a cross-sectoral challenge, the digital transformation of Europe has become an issue of political power. The European Union’s perceived drift towards progressive technological and political disempowerment brings into question the industrial policy path followed by the EU over the twenty-year period since US-based ICT pioneering companies started to successfully develop and market Internet-related services and products. With the digital gap steadily widening over time, European institutions have progressively shifted their digital objectives from a full catch-up policy to a specialization strategy recentred on the current digital transformation of European industry, described today as the fourth industrial revolution. In doing so, the EU has in a way acknowledged that US tech prime movers and Chinese followers have become strong incumbents, making the building up of a European competitive advantage in digital services to the consumer unlikely. By contrast, EU industrial policy instruments have remained relatively constant over the years although results failed to convincingly materialize, recognition of which has entailed the adaptation of EU digital objectives. The EU has maintained a two-pronged approach throughout, on the one hand coordinating decentralized Member States’ Research & Development (R&D) policies to boost digital innovation and adoption, and on the other hand setting Europe-wide norms to help innovating companies scale up and reinforce their market position worldwide. Although the EU is increasingly considered a digital standard setter on the regulatory front, this two-fold approach has so far failed to spur the emergence of strong leading digital innovators apart from a few corporate icons such as Spotify, SAP, Nokia, and Ericsson. The perpetuation of failing policies, this chapter shall argue, is strongly linked to the long-standing resilience of technological rivalries between key Member States and between their national champions, mainly specialized in mature and traditional sectors. These rivalries have structurally shaped industrial policies and the related EU institutional framework, and in so doing, they have stymied the objectives of developing the overarching political instruments underpinning both US and China industrial policies: a centralized management of public financial resources and a centralized management of strategic research, development, and procurement policies. It could be argued that the EU, being a regional construction, can hardly claim state apparatus prerogatives. Indeed, as key industrial policy instruments have remained at the level of EU Member States, the industrial path carved out by the EU could not result in unifying political and social cohesion around the rising stakes of the digital transformation, unlike in the US and China. The EU’s digital transformation is less a matter of digital dependency to be solved than a matter of industrial path dependency to be overcome.

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/289555

المؤلفون: Neyrinck, Norman, Petit, Nicolas

مصطلحات موضوعية: Competition law, Industrial policy, Antitrust, Globalization, Law, criminology & political science :: European & international law, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques :: Droit européen & international

الوصف: The present Report on "EU European competition law enforcement and the challenges of globalisation" adrresses a series of expert questions. It is part of a fact-finding mission of the European Affairs Committee of the National Assembly of the French Republic. The objective of this fact-finding mission is to draw the consequences of the veto imposed on the merger between Siemens and Alstom in February 2019 and to assess whether European competition law is now ill-adapted to the new challenges posed by the globalization of the economy. The objective assigned to the information mission is to find possible ways of reforming this law in order to enable the emergence of European "industrial champions", while respecting the objective of consumer protection.
Ce rapport répond à une série de questions-réponses portant sur « le droit européen de la concurrence face aux enjeux de la mondialisation ». Il s'inscrit dans le cadre d'une mission d'information de la Commission des affaires européennes de l’Assemblée nationale de la République française. L’objectif de cette mission d’information est de tirer les conséquences du veto opposé au rapprochement entre Siemens et Alstom en février 2019 et de mesurer si le droit européen de la concurrence se trouve désormais inadapté aux nouveaux enjeux posés par la mondialisation de l’économie. L'objectif assigné à la mission d'information est de trouver les modalités éventuelles de réformes de ce droit afin de permettre de faire émerger des « champions industriels » européens, tout en respectant l’objectif de protection des consommateurs.

وصف الملف: 73

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/246210

المؤلفون: Nouveau, Patricia

المساهمون: CEFIR - Center for European Relations Studies - ULiège

المصدر: 26th World Congress of Political Science, Lisbon, Portugal [PT], 10 -15 July 2021

مصطلحات موضوعية: Digital sovereignty, European Union, industrial policy, international political economy, Law, criminology & political science, Political science, public administration & international relations, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques, Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales

الوصف: The growing convergence of traditional industries and digital technologies has enhanced EU overreliance on foreign hardware and software inputs, better served or only served by US and Chinese firms. The expansion of digital technologies towards general-purpose and dual-use applications first questions European traditional industries’ ability to retain control and reap the full benefits of their now-required digital transformation. It also casts doubt on the EU capability to provide - if necessary - secured and autonomous digital supply chains thanks to home-grown industries. US-China rising confrontation over technological hegemony makes the ability for EU Member-States to make autonomous choices in terms of digital policies even more compelling.Against that backdrop, the European institutions and some Member-States now stress the necessity to preserve their “strategic autonomy” and “digital sovereignty”. However, already in 2000, EU Lisbon strategy was acknowledging the imperative for the emergence of EU-based high-tech champions in ICT industries. The industrial policy goals set in the Lisbon strategy and replicated in the agenda 2020 have failed to convincingly materialise, raising the question of the necessary economic and political conditions for the European Union to successfully develop the missing digital capabilities, as a basis for strategic autonomy.This paper will first show that EU digital missing capabilities not only entail strong technological dependencies, but they also bear the risk for Europe to lose its industrial competitive advantages and they cast some doubts about EU strategic autonomy. Such a situation has triggered at the EU level the implementation of digital sovereignty-driven industrial policies, which turn out to mainly focus on the preservation of EU industrial strongholds and not necessarily on bridging all missing capabilities’ gap. Furthermore, to achieve these restricted objectives, the EU relies on unchanged policy instruments although these instruments have in the past failed to convincingly develop territorially based ICT capacities. In a way, the extent of EU digital dependencies contrasts starkly with the above-mentioned policy limitations.This paper argues that the limitations to EU industrial policy goals and instruments are strongly linked to the long-standing resilience of industrial and technological rivalries between EU national champions, mainly specialised in mature and traditional sectors. These rivalries have contributed to structurally shape European industrial policies and the related EU institutional framework. In doing so, they hampered some unifying social cohesion around the rising stakes of the digital transformation, unlike in the US and China. Therefore, this paper concludes that EU’s digital sovereignty goal is structurally linked to the emergence of such a “digital cohesion” and to the alignment of national corporate elites through intra-European industrial and capital alliances, further interlocking industrial vested interests (to be further investigated).

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/289763

المؤلفون: Petit, Nicolas, Neyrinck, Norman

المساهمون: Institut d'Etudes Juridiques Européennes, research center

مصطلحات موضوعية: Industrial Policy, Competition Law, Enforcement, Politique industrielle, Droit de la concurrence, Politique publique, Law, criminology & political science :: European & international law, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques :: Droit européen & international

الوصف: This paper muses on whether there can be, there is, and there should exist a nexus between European Union (“EU”) competition law and industrial policy. A well-known, long lasting grievance in the history of EU competition law is indeed that the European Commission (“the Commission”) has allegedly enforced the competition rules dogmatically, and turned a blind eye on industrial policy considerations. Lately, this policy debate has revived. With the current economic debacle in the Western world, decades of free-market economic policies – including competition policies – inherited from the so-called “Washington consensus” are called into question. In contrast, thriving economic models like Brazil, China, or India where the State interferes with the market at the expense of free competition, are increasingly looked by the “old world” as a possible source of inspiration.Those new developments justify devoting another paper to the question whether industrial policy considerations could and should inform EU competition enforcement. To address it, we follow a four steps methodology. We first solve definitional issues by describing the various possible meanings of “industrial policy” (I). Second, we follow a legalistic approach to review whether such considerations can, as a matter of positive law, play a role (II). Third, we turn to empirical analysis, to examine if there has been some industrial policy influence in the Commission’s case-law (III). Fourth, we review consequentialist arguments to assess whether industrial policy considerations should play a stronger role in EU competition enforcement (IV).
Cette contribution s’interroge sur la question de savoir s’il peut y avoir, il y a, et s’il doit exister un lien entre le droit de la concurrence de l’Union européenne (« UE ») et la politique industrielle. Une critique ancienne et bien connue dans l'histoire du droit européen de la concurrence est en effet que la Commission européenne ("la Commission") applique prétendument les règles de la concurrence de façon dogmatique et ferme les yeux sur les considérations de politique industrielle. Ces derniers temps, ce débat est revenu sur le devant de la scène. En raison de la débâcle économique actuelle du monde occidental, des décennies de politiques économiques de libre marché – y compris les politiques de concurrence – hérités du dénommé «consensus de Washington» sont remises en question. En revanche, les modèles économiques en plein essor tels que le Brésil, la Chine ou l'Inde, où l'État interfère avec le marché au détriment de la libre concurrence, sont de plus en plus regardés par le «vieux monde» comme une possible source d'inspiration.Ces nouveaux développements justifient qu’un nouvel article soit consacré à la question de savoir si des considérations de politique industrielle pourraient et devraient influencer l'application de la concurrence de l’UE. Pour répondre à cette question, nous suivons une méthodologie en quatre étapes. Nous résolvons d'abord les questions de définition en décrivant les diverses significations possibles de la notion de « politique industrielle » (I). Deuxièmement, nous suivons une approche légaliste de vérifier si de telles considérations peuvent jouer un rôle en droit positif (II). Troisièmement, nous nous tournons vers l'analyse empirique afin d'examiner si la politique industrielle a eu une certaine influence sur la jurisprudence de la Commission (III). Quatrièmement, nous passons en revue les arguments conséquentialistes pour évaluer si des considérations de politique industrielle devraient jouer un rôle plus important dans la mise en œuvre du droit de la concurrence de l’UE (IV).

Relation: 2012 GCLC Annual Conference, 8-9 November 2012, Residence Palace, Brussels (8-9 Novembre 2012)

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/153810

المؤلفون: Merenne-Schoumaker, Bernadette

المساهمون: SEGEFA : Service d’Etudes en Géographie économique fondamentale et appliquée, research center

المصدر: Les Fondements d’une politique industrielle et énergétique pour l’Europe. Bull Liaison Memb Soc Géogr, (Hors série), 112-126.Paris, FranceSociété de Géographie de Paris. (2009).

مصطلحات موضوعية: Industrial Policy, Energetic Policy, European Union, Politique industrielle, Politique énergétique, Union Européenne, Business & economic sciences :: International economics, Sciences économiques & de gestion :: Economie internationale, Business & economic sciences :: Special economic topics (health, labor, transportation…), Sciences économiques & de gestion :: Domaines particuliers de l'économie (santé, travail, transport…), Social & behavioral sciences, psychology :: Regional & inter-regional studies, Sciences sociales & comportementales, psychologie :: Etudes régionales & interrégionales

الوصف: Malgré la mise en place de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA) en 1952 et un traité Euratom en 1958, l’Union européenne (UE) n’a toujours pas de réelle politique industrielle ni de réelle politique énergétique. Certes, différentes mesures ont été initiées à partir de 1990 et à la suite de la Stratégie de Lisbonne (2000) qui vise à faire de l’Union européenne « l’économie de la connaissance la plus compétitive et la plus dynamique du monde » à l’horizon 2010. Une politique industrielle se met ainsi progressivement en œuvre. Parallèlement, il est de plus en plus question d’une politique énergétique.L’objectif de ce travail est de comprendre le pourquoi de ces nouvelles stratégies en recherchant leurs fondements.

Relation: L’identité europénne : ses fondements historiques et géographiques, Paris, France (29-30 mars 2008)

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/70173

المؤلفون: Nouveau, Patricia

المصدر: EU strategic sovereignty and Industrial policy after Versailles, 29 Mars 2022

مصطلحات موضوعية: European Union, strategic autonomy, European industrial policy, sovereignty, Law, criminology & political science, Political science, public administration & international relations, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques, Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales

الوصف: Two weeks after the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the heads of state and government of the EU gathered in Versailles on 10-11 March 2022 for an informal meeting. On this occasion, EU leaders engaged in ‘bolstering their defence capabilities, reducing their energy dependencies and building a more robust economic base’. They agreed to significantly increase defence expenditures (without however specifying an amount) and to bolster defence joint-projects and procurement schemes in order to develop the necessary and sometimes missing strategic capabilities. They also set the objective to ‘phase out European dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports as soon as possible’ by increasing imports of LNG from other markets, improving energy efficiency and accelerating investments in renewable energy. Finally, the Versailles Declaration reiterates the need for reducing strategic dependencies on critical raw materials, semi-conductors, digital technologies, and essential medical products and foodstuff. However, EU leaders remained divided on the implementation of a new resilience scheme (on the model of the Covid-19 pandemic recovery plan NextgenerationEU) to boost new investments in renewable energy and defence projects.The search for strategic autonomy and sovereignty has gained momentum at the EU level with the deterioration of US-China relations. The Covid-19 pandemic and now the war in Ukraine have made EU strategic autonomy even more compelling, as the Versailles Declaration emphasizes. However these objectives raise significant challenges because of numerous structural weaknesses of the EU, notably the reluctance of Member States to transfer industrial policy tools to a supranational level, but also the absence of an esprit de corps among industrialists in light of the rivalries between national business elites, the lack of centralized power over the internal market and Europe’s technological dependence on the US.To discuss these challenges faced by the EU, Egmont, the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies of KU Leuven, the Institute for European Studies of UCLouvain Saint-Louis have gathered a panel of academics that have been analysing these challenges in recent research projects. The panel will assess to what extent the new EU strategies to serve the Union’s sovereignty and economic robustness goals depart from the EU’s traditional industrial policy approach, such as the Lisbon Strategy or Europe 2020. The panel will also discuss the structural differences between EU, China and US industrial and technological policy schemes as well as attempt to present various scenarios regarding the future of Europe’s strategic sovereignty.

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/289598

المؤلفون: Nouveau, Patricia, Defraigne, Jean-Christophe

المصدر: Séminaire d'économie, Bordeaux, France [FR], 15 Février 2022

مصطلحات موضوعية: strategic autonomy, European Union, industrial policy, digital policy, Business & economic sciences, International economics, Law, criminology & political science, Political science, public administration & international relations, Sciences économiques & de gestion, Economie internationale, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques, Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales

الوصف: Une note de la Commission européenne rendue publique en juin 2020 et intitulée « Une politique commerciale revisitée pour une Europe plus forte » marque clairement des limites à la conception plus libérale qui avait inspiré les politiques commerciales et industrielles de l’Union européenne au cours des années 1990-2000 : « La crise liée à la pandémie de COVID-19 a mis en lumière un certain nombre de vulnérabilités (…) Nous devons donc évaluer comment améliorer notre résilience. L’Union devrait par conséquent poursuivre un modèle d’« autonomie stratégique ouverte ». Cela signifie simplement qu’il convient de renforcer la capacité de l’Union à poursuivre ses propres intérêts de manière indépendante et déterminée, tout en continuant à travailler avec des partenaires dans le monde entier afin de trouver des solutions mondiales aux défis mondiaux. Il est aussi peu probable que l’Union soit autosuffisante dans la production de certains produits sanitaires complexes cruciaux qu’il n’est possible de lutter seul contre les défis mondiaux. Une plus grande résilience passe par la compréhension de nos dépendances et la réduction de nos vulnérabilités grâce à la combinaison des bonnes mesures ».Ce concept d’autonomie stratégique ouverte n’est pas très clairement défini. Son origine semble venir au départ du secteur prive qui craint des abus de positions dominantes par les Big Tech américaines au fur et a mesure de la digitalisation des processus de production, de la distribution et des services et dans une moindre mesure les Big Tech chinoises depuis la fin des années 2010. Il semble essentiellement viser a une autonomisation de l’UE vis-à-vis de ses partenaires dans les nouvelles technologies sans pour autant adopter une position protectionniste. Mais au-delà de la rhétorique, force est de constater qu’aucun nouvel outil à force contraignante n’a modifié les aspects de politiques industrielles au niveau de l’UE.Est-ce que l’Union européenne peut adopter une politique industrielle qui puisse permettre aux économies qui la composent une autonomie stratégique face aux GAFAM, aux BATX et aux risques liés aux chaînes de valeurs ?

Relation: https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/agenda/seminaire-deconomie-jean-christophe-defraigne-patricia-nouveau/; Séminaires organisés à Bordeaux Sciences économiques; https://www.bse.u-bordeaux.fr/seminaires/

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/289751

المؤلفون: Nouveau, Patricia

المصدر: European Union's digital governance versus United States' digital dominance. Revue de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Liège, 2(2), 207-234.Bruxelles, BelgiumDe Boeck et Larcier. (2020).

مصطلحات موضوعية: European Union, International Political Economy, Industrial Policy, Digital policy, European economics, European Policies, Law, criminology & political science :: Political science, public administration & international relations, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques :: Sciences politiques, administration publique & relations internationales

الوصف: Since the launch of the Lisbon strategy in 2000, the EU’s industrial policy goals have targeted the provision of an efficient environment for R&D investors, greater innovation and development of knowledge-intensive sectors. The Lisbon strategy acknowledged the competitive edge in high-tech & digital industries gained by US champions in the 1980s/1990s. However, neither the implementation of the Lisbon strategy nor the following agenda 2020 have succeeded in achieving increased R&D spending and generating significantly robust EU-based companies in ICT sectors that could compete with US firms. Conversely, there is a growing competitiveness gap between EU and US ICT firms that dominate EU markets. Meanwhile, the European Commission pushed by some key Member States has taken a series of regulatory initiatives presented as measures to ensure a level playing field on EU’s digital internal market. This paper will demonstrate that the EU inability to catch up with US digital advance has led European institutions to increasingly use regulations as defensive and indirect industrial policy tools to protect the EU market against US tech giants and to provide EU companies with more favourable conditions to enter the digital race and in particular to jump on the Internet of Things’ bandwagon.

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/259371

المؤلفون: Petit, Nicolas

المصدر: Concurrences : Revue des Droits de la Concurrence, 4-2008, 182-187. Paris, France: Institut de Droit de la Concurrence (France) (2008).

مصطلحات موضوعية: competition, merger, non competition concerns, industrial policy, social concerns, concurrence, concentration, non concurrentiel, politique industrielle, problèmes sociaux, Law, criminology & political science :: European & international law, Droit, criminologie & sciences politiques :: Droit européen & international

الوصف: This article lists the EC merger cases where noncompetition concerns were raised (industrialpolicy, social concerns, personal data protection etc.). It summarizes the issues raised by non-competition concerns in the ECMR.

URL الوصول: https://orbi.uliege.be/handle/2268/22384