المؤلفون: Gong, Shiyang, Li, Qian, Su, Song, Zhang, Juanjuan

المصدر: Management Science; Jun2024, Vol. 70 Issue 6, p3902-3922, 21p

مصطلحات موضوعية: MOLECULAR genetics, GENETIC variation, PERSONALITY, CUSTOMER orientation, MARKETING

مستخلص: This paper presents one of the first marketing applications of molecular genetics. We report evidence that salespeople's genetic variants linked to educational attainment predict sales performance. Both genetics and selling effort contribute to sales performance, whereas genetics contribute more than personality traits. We further show that adaptive learning, as captured in salespeople's customer orientation and opportunity recognition skills, may explain the gene-sales relationship. We discuss the implications of these findings for sales management and the value of genetic research for the marketing field. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Funding: S. Gong acknowledges financial support from the NSFC [Grant 71972040] and Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [2022NTSS43]. Q. Li acknowledges financial support from the NSFC [Grant 72072014] and Young Talent Program of Beijing Foreign Studies University. S. Su acknowledges financial support from the NSFC [Grant 71872016]. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4879. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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المؤلفون: Li, Kathleen T., Shankar, Venkatesh

المصدر: Management Science; Jun2024, Vol. 70 Issue 6, p3734-3747, 14p

مصطلحات موضوعية: EVENT marketing, RESEARCH personnel, INSPECTION & review, TAMPONS, CAUSAL inference

مصطلحات جغرافية: NEW York (State)

مستخلص: Marketing researchers are often interested in estimating causal effects when a randomized experiment is infeasible. The synthetic control (SC) method has emerged as a powerful tool in these quasiexperimental settings. It is important to verify the SC parallel pretrends assumption, the testable part of the identifying assumption, because its violation may lead to biased estimates. However, no formal test exists, so researchers have to rely on visual inspection. Even with a formal test, researchers still need to know how to balance the bias-efficiency trade-off for the estimate. We fill this void and advance the two-step synthetic control (TSSC) approach that comprises a formal test for the SC pretrends assumption in the first step and recommends an appropriate method that balances the dual goal of reducing bias and increasing efficiency in the second step. Simulations show that the TSSC approach performs favorably in the bias-variance (bias-efficiency) trade-off. Applying the TSSC approach, we find that New York State's repeal of the tampon tax caused a positive and significant (2.08%) increase in weekly tampon sales. Using theory, simulations, and empirics, we demonstrate the importance, validity, and usefulness of the TSSC approach. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendix are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4878. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Akerlof, Robert, Holden, Richard, Rayo, Luis

المصدر: Management Science; Jun2024, Vol. 70 Issue 6, p4037-4050, 14p

مصطلحات موضوعية: MULTILEVEL marketing, BUSINESS planning, MARKET share, IMPULSE buying, CONSUMERS, EXTERNALITIES, PRICES

مستخلص: We propose a monopoly and Stackelberg duopoly model for "new economy" markets—with a Beckerian S-shaped demand curve at its center—that allows for intermediate degrees of firm focality and consumer heterogeneity. Because of network externalities, firms compete for the dominant market share, rather than the marginal consumer. This leads to a type of limit pricing—from within, rather than from outside the market—where the nondominant firm captures a positive market share that serves as a consolation prize. We characterize how firms' technologies, "consumer impulses" (which might be influenced by past sales, defaults, or advertising), and network externalities affect competition, and derive implications for firm strategy. Broadly speaking, we find that the dominant firm should adopt an aggressive "top-dog" stance (akin to, but not identical to, that of a firm seeking to deter rival entry), whereas the nondominant firm should respond with an accommodating "puppy-dog" approach. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. Funding: R. Akerlof received financial support from the Institute for New Economic Thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Candogan, Ozan, Chen, Chen, Niazadeh, Rad

المصدر: Management Science; Jun2024, Vol. 70 Issue 6, p4069-4086, 18p

مصطلحات موضوعية: ONLINE social networks, MACHINE learning, DYNAMIC programming, REVENUE management, MARKETING effectiveness

الشركة/الكيان: AIRBNB Inc.

مستخلص: Experimentation is prevalent in online marketplaces and social networks to assess the effectiveness of new market intervention. To mitigate the interference among users in an experiment, a common practice is to use a cluster-based experiment, where the designer partitions the market into loosely connected clusters and assigns all users in the same cluster to the same variant (treatment or control). Given the experiment, we assume an unbiased Horvitz–Thompson estimator is used to estimate the total market effect of the treatment. We consider the optimization problem of choosing (correlated) randomized assignments of clusters to treatment and control to minimize the worst-case variance of the estimator under a constraint that the marginal assignment probability is q∈(0,1) for all clusters. This problem can be formulated as a linear program where both the number of decision variables and constraints are exponential in the number of clusters—and hence is generally computationally intractable. We develop a family of practical experiments that we refer to as independent block randomization (IBR) experiments. Such an experiment partitions clusters into blocks so that each block contains clusters of similar size. It then treats a fraction q of the clusters in each block (chosen uniformly at random) and does so independently across blocks. The optimal cluster partition can be obtained in a tractable way using dynamic programming. We show that these policies are asymptotically optimal when the number of clusters grows large and no cluster size dominates the rest. In the special case where cluster sizes take values in a finite set and the number of clusters of each size is a fixed proportion of the total number of clusters, the loss is only a constant that is independent of the number of clusters. Beyond the asymptotic regime, we show that the IBR experiment has a good approximation for any problem instance when q is not very tiny. We also examine the performance of the IBR experiments on data-driven numerical examples, including examples based on Airbnb and Facebook data. This paper was accepted by Itai Ashlagi, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: O. Candogan acknowledges NSF [Award 2216912] for "Institute for Data, Econometrics, Algorithms and Learning." Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.02741. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Kerimov, Süleyman, Ashlagi, Itai, Gurvich, Itai

المصدر: Management Science; May2024, Vol. 70 Issue 5, p2799-2822, 24p

مصطلحات موضوعية: REGRET, REVENUE management, MARKETING management

الشركة/الكيان: NATIONAL Science Foundation (U.S.), UNITED States. Dept. of Defense

مستخلص: We study how to optimally match agents in a dynamic matching market with heterogeneous match cardinalities and values. A network topology determines the feasible matches in the market. In general, a fundamental tradeoff exists between short-term value—which calls for performing matches frequently—and long-term value—which calls, sometimes, for delaying match decisions in order to perform better matches. We find that in networks that satisfy a general position condition, the tension between short- and long-term value is limited, and a simple periodic clearing policy (nearly) maximizes the total match value simultaneously at all times. Central to our results is the general position gap ϵ; a proxy for capacity slack in the market. With the exception of trivial cases, no policy can achieve an all-time regret that is smaller, in terms of order, than ϵ−1. We achieve this lower bound with a policy, which periodically resolves a natural matching integer linear program, provided that the delay between resolving periods is of the order of ϵ−1. Examples illustrate the necessity of some delay to alleviate the tension between short- and long-term value. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant CMM-2010940] and the U.S. Department of Defense [Grant STTR A18B-T007]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Bacchiega, Emanuele, Colucci, Mariachiara, Denicolò, Vincenzo, Magnani, Marco

المصدر: Management Science; May2024, Vol. 70 Issue 5, p3182-3199, 18p

مصطلحات موضوعية: BRANDING (Marketing), BRAND extension, MORAL hazard, BRAND name products

مستخلص: This paper challenges two common views of brand dilution: first, that it is exclusively the unintended consequence of a poorly executed strategy of brand extension and, second, that its likelihood is heightened by brand licensing. Using a new theoretical model, we show that brand dilution can be seen not just as an unfortunate development to be avoided, but as an opportunity to monetize the brand. We further show that, at the relevant margin, switching from in-house development to licensing reduces the risk of brand dilution. The model offers a novel perspective on some important managerial choices and generates a series of empirically testable hypotheses. This paper was accepted by Dmitri Kuksov, marketing. Funding: Financial support from PRIN 20157NHSTP004 is gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.00852. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Morozov, Ilya

المصدر: Management Science; Nov2023, Vol. 69 Issue 11, p6988-7008, 21p

مصطلحات موضوعية: NEW product development, FRICTION, CONSUMERS' surplus, PRODUCT launches, CONSUMPTION (Economics), MARKETING

مستخلص: I study how much consumers benefit from new products in markets with information frictions. I analyze new products in the U.S. hard drive market, which is characterized by ample product innovation. Using unique click-stream data, I measure the magnitude of two frictions, category consideration and costly search, and show that both play a crucial role in shaping consumer demand. To estimate consumer surplus from new products, I develop a search model that captures both frictions and propose a novel Bayesian estimation method to recover its parameters. I then show that ignoring information frictions leads researchers to underestimate the consumer surplus from new hard drives because it appears that consumers do not value the combinations of attributes these hard drives offer. Partly eliminating frictions, through marketing efforts or market-wide transparency initiatives, can help consumers to more fully internalize the benefits of new product launches. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing. Supplemental Material: The data files and online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4729. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Sockin, Michael, Xiong, Wei

المصدر: Management Science; Nov2023, Vol. 69 Issue 11, p6684-6707, 24p

مصطلحات موضوعية: NETWORK effect, CRYPTOCURRENCIES, PRICES, BLOCKCHAINS, SOCIAL marketing, DIGITAL technology

مستخلص: We model cryptocurrencies as utility tokens used by a decentralized digital platform to facilitate transactions between users of certain goods or services. The network effect governing user participation, in conjunction with the nonneutrality of the token price, can cause the token market to break down. We show that token retradeability mitigates this risk of breakdown on younger platforms by harnessing user optimism but worsens this fragility when sentiment trading by speculators crowds out users. Elastic token issuance mitigates this fragility, but strategic attacks by miners exacerbate it because users' anticipation of future losses depresses the token's resale value. This paper was accepted by Agostino Capponi, Special Section of Management Science: Blockchains and Crypto Economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Câmara, Odilon, Jia, Nan, Raffiee, Joseph

المصدر: Management Science; Nov2023, Vol. 69 Issue 11, p7022-7043, 22p

مصطلحات موضوعية: REPUTATION, LABOR market, COMPETITIVE advantage in business, STRATEGIC communication, BUSINESS planning, COMMUNICATION in marketing

مستخلص: We examine strategic communication in labor market recommendations. Our formal model features two-sided asymmetric information: An adviser has private information about his own preference bias for a focal candidate and a signal of the quality of this candidate, whereas the hiring firm has private information about the quality of an alternative candidate. The adviser can choose whether to recommend his focal candidate to the firm. If he recommends and the firm hires the candidate, then the adviser pays a reputational cost (receives a reputation boost) if the firm later learns that the hire has low quality (high quality). Our main results describe how the equilibrium behavior of advisers (lying choices) and firms (hiring choices) depend on the intricate interplay between preference biases, reputation, lying costs, and the hiring firm's labor market strength (access to alternative candidates with higher quality). We show that the equilibrium features assortative matching: advisers with a higher (lower) reputation choose to lie less (more), and consequently, their candidates are more likely to be hired by firms with strong (weak) access to high-skilled outside candidates. Two equilibrium forces create a "rich get richer" effect. First, advisers choose to lie less to hiring firms with access to better top candidates, further benefiting those firms. Second, advisers with a higher (lower) reputation choose to lie less (more), which increases (decreases) their future reputation, creating a "reputation trap." We discuss the implications of our model for hiring strategy, referral systems, and the ability to accrue and sustain human capital-based competitive advantages. This paper was accepted by Alfonso Gambardella, business strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

المؤلفون: Garcia, Daniel, Janssen, Maarten C. W., Shopova, Radostina

المصدر: Management Science; Sep2023, Vol. 69 Issue 9, p5275-5297, 23p, 2 Charts, 5 Graphs

مصطلحات موضوعية: TIME-based pricing, AIRLINE tickets, REVENUE management, PRICE increases, PRICES, MARKETING management, HEALTH insurance exchanges

مستخلص: In markets, such as those for airline tickets and hotel accommodations, firms sell time-dated products and have private information about unsold capacities. We show that competition under private information may explain observed phenomena, such as increased price dispersion and higher expected prices toward the deadline. We also show that private information severely limits the market power of firms and that information exchange about capacity increases firms' profits. Finally, we inquire into the incentives to unilaterally disclose information or to engage in espionage about rival's capacity and show that they increase firms' profits compared with the private information setting. This paper was accepted by Omar Besbes, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was partially funded by the Austrian Science Foundation FWF under [Project FG 6]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4613. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Management Science is the property of INFORMS: Institute for Operations Research and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)