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المؤلفون: Dijkstra, Jacob, van Assen, Marcel A L M, Social Networks, Solidarity and Inequality, Leerstoel Buskens
المساهمون: Sociology/ICS, Social Networks, Solidarity and Inequality, Leerstoel Buskens, Department of Methodology and Statistics
المصدر: The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 41(1), 1-25. TAYLOR & FRANCIS INC
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 41(1), 1. Taylor and Francis Ltd.
The Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 41(1), 1-25. Taylor and Francis Ltd.مصطلحات موضوعية: 050402 sociology, Sociology and Political Science, media_common.quotation_subject, SOCIAL DILEMMAS, Rationality, COMPETITION, PREFERENCES, PUBLIC-GOODS, 0504 sociology, Complete information, 0502 economics and business, Economics, incomplete information, REPUTATION, Selfishness, 050207 economics, EXCHANGE, prisoner's dilemma, media_common, Algebra and Number Theory, sequential play, 05 social sciences, Prisoner's dilemma, Social dilemma, repeated play, RECIPROCITY, Reciprocity (evolution), Dilemma, Cooperation, prisoner’s dilemma, RATIONAL COOPERATION, FAIRNESS, TRUST, Social psychology, Mathematical economics, Social Sciences (miscellaneous), Reputation
الوصف: Explaining cooperation in social dilemmas is a central issue in behavioral science, and the prisoner's dilemma (PD) is the most frequently employed model. Theories assuming rationality and selfishness predict no cooperation in PDs of finite duration, but cooperation is frequently observed. We therefore build a model of how individuals in a finitely repeated PD with incomplete information about their partner's preference for mutual cooperation decide about cooperation. We study cooperation in simultaneous and sequential PDs. Our model explains three behavioral regularities found in the literature: (i) the frequent cooperation in one-shot and finitely repeated N-shot games, (ii) cooperation rates declining over the course of the game, and (iii) cooperation being more frequent in the sequential PD than in the simultaneous PD.
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