المؤلفون: Damianov, Damian

المصدر: Economic Theory; Sep2012, Vol. 51 Issue 1, p105-137, 33p

مصطلحات موضوعية: GAME theory, AUCTIONS, ECONOMIC competition, ECONOMIC equilibrium, DISTRIBUTION (Economic theory), ECONOMIC convergence, DEALERS (Retail trade)

مستخلص: This paper analyzes a market game in which sellers offer trading mechanisms to buyers and buyers decide which seller to go to depending on the trading mechanisms offered. In a (subgame perfect) equilibrium of this market, sellers hold auctions with an efficient reserve price but charge an entry fee. The entry fee depends on the number of buyers and sellers, the distribution of buyer valuations, and the buyer cost of entering the market. As the size of the market increases, the entry fee decreases and converges to zero in the limit. We study how the surplus of buyers and sellers depends on the number of agents on each side of the market in this decentralized trading environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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المؤلفون: Bejan, Camelia, Bidian, Florin

المصدر: Economic Theory; Aug2012, Vol. 50 Issue 3, p571-602, 32p

مصطلحات موضوعية: ECONOMIC structure, ECONOMIC efficiency, STOCKHOLDERS, ECONOMIC competition, DISTRIBUTION (Economic theory), BUSINESS enterprises, ECONOMIC convergence

مستخلص: We analyze the limit behavior of sequences of oligopolistic equilibria in which firms follow objectives consistent with their shareholders' interests. We show that convergence to a competitive outcome may fail for some distributions of firms' shares across consumers and provide a characterization of the class of ownership structures that lead to Walrasian equilibrium allocations in the limit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

: Copyright of Economic Theory is the property of Springer Nature and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)