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1
المساهمون: Accounting (ABS, FEB)
المصدر: Abacus-A Journal of Accounting Finance and Business Studies, 57(4), 709-736. Wiley-Blackwell
Koenigsgruber, R, Perotti, P, Schinnerl, O, Tsoligkas, F & Windisch, D 2021, ' Product Market Competition and Firms’ Disclosure of Cross-Segment Differences in Performance ', Abacus A Journal of Accounting Finance and Business Studies, vol. 57, no. 4, pp. 709-736 . https://doi.org/10.1111/abac.12212مصطلحات موضوعية: Product market, Product market competition, Competitor analysis, Competition (economics), Existing competition, Incentive, Segment reporting, Negatively associated, Accounting, Cross-segment differences, Profitability index, Business, Potential competition, health care economics and organizations, Industrial organization
الوصف: This study examines how product market competition affects firms’ disclosures of their individual segment's performance. We explicitly account for different types of product market competition by distinguishing between competitors who are already active in a particular market and potential competitors who are considering entering the market. Arguably, firms that are subject to intensive existing competition have lower incentives to conceal information because they are less likely to exhibit abnormal profitability. By contrast, a high level of potential competition constitutes a threat to profitability and hence provides incentives to conceal segment performance. In line with these proprietary cost arguments, we find that potential competition is negatively associated with the disclosure of cross-segment differences in performance, whereas existing competition is positively associated with the disclosure of cross-segment differences in performance. Our results remain robust to a number of sensitivity tests.
وصف الملف: application/pdf
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المؤلفون: Chunyan Fu, Yuqiong Li, yongxi yi, Shiyang Liu
المصدر: Sustainable Production and Consumption. 28:610-623
مصطلحات موضوعية: Environmental Engineering, Product market, Renewable Energy, Sustainability and the Environment, Subsidy, Social Welfare, Environmental pollution, Cournot competition, Environmental economics, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Extended producer responsibility, Incentive, Stackelberg competition, Environmental Chemistry, Business
الوصف: The dual constraints of resource scarcity and environmental pollution have affected sustainable socio-economic development. However, the widely used Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) system has paid little attention to resource conservation. Therefore, this paper proposes a different extended producer responsibility system (FEPR) to fill this gap. It includes two types of games, i.e., a Stackelberg game that a government games with manufacturers and a recycler, and a Cournot game between manufacturers in a product market. Through game analysis and data example analysis, draw the following critical management insights: an optimal joint tax-subsidy policy can maximize social welfare and incentive eco-innovations; market competition between manufacturers can simultaneously improve market efficiency and ecological efficiency in a well-run FEPR system; resource use tax should raise in both vertical and horizontal technology overflow, environmental cost, recycling difficulty, and the number of manufacturers while the optimal subsidy rate is only positively affected by the environmental cost of waste. The research results show that our FEPR system can save resources, reduce waste pollution, and improve social welfare simultaneously. According to different implementation backgrounds, the government should adjust the joint tax subsidy mechanism for the system to achieve optimal results.
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المؤلفون: Chul-Hi Park, Sang-Ho Lee, Toshihiro Matsumura
المصدر: Journal of Economics. 135:255-283
مصطلحات موضوعية: Product (business), Economics and Econometrics, Monopolistic competition, Incentive, Downstream (manufacturing), Product market, Deadweight loss, ComputerApplications_COMPUTERSINOTHERSYSTEMS, Business, Monopoly, General Business, Management and Accounting, Vertical integration, Industrial organization
الوصف: This article presents a model in which two downstream firms compete in a differentiated product market and choose whether to adopt new advanced inputs supplied by the monopolist or competitively supplied standard inputs. When the downstream firms are independent of the monopolistic supplier, from the welfare viewpoint, the incentive to adopt the new inputs is insufficient (can be excessive) given that the rival firm does not (does) adopt. When the monopoly supplier and one downstream firm merge, such integration increases the unintegrated downstream firm’s incentive to adopt the new input supplied by the rival, spreading new inputs in the industry. We emphasize the price-increasing effect under the commitment to procure advanced inputs and show that vertical integration can be harmful to welfare despite the increase in product quality and the reduction in the welfare loss due to double marginalization.
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المؤلفون: Matthew J. Bloomfield
المصدر: Journal of Financial Economics. 141:620-643
مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics and Econometrics, Product market, Restructuring, Strategy and Management, Cournot competition, Incentive, Accounting, Strategic delegation, Revenue, Production (economics), Business, Market share, Finance, Industrial organization
الوصف: A 2006 rule change in the United States mandated that publicly traded firms provide more detailed disclosures about executives’ compensation plans. In response to the new disclosure requirements, Cournot firms with large market shares add revenue-based pay to their CEOs’ pay packages. This change in pay practices coincides with a shift towards more aggressive product market equilibria, characterized by greater production expenditures and lower margins. Jointly, these patterns are consistent with predictions from the theory of “strategic delegation,” and suggest that the new disclosure requirements enhanced the viability of committing through executive incentives. After adopting the new disclosure requirements, many firms appear to restructure their executives’ pay packages as strategic devices designed to make rivals curtail their competitive actions.
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المؤلفون: Alessandro Fedele, Cristian Roner
المصدر: Journal of Economic Surveys. 36:157-187
مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics and Econometrics, ComputingMilieux_THECOMPUTINGPROFESSION, Product market, media_common.quotation_subject, Frame (networking), ComputingMilieux_LEGALASPECTSOFCOMPUTING, Competitor analysis, Investment (macroeconomics), Computer security, computer.software_genre, Interdependence, Incentive, Economics, Cyberspace, computer, media_common
الوصف: Cybersecurity has gained prominence in the decision-making of firms. Due to the increasing occurrences of threats in the cyberspace, investments in cybersecurity have become critical to mitigate the operational disruption of businesses. This paper surveys the theoretical literature on the firms’ incentives to invest in cybersecurity. A taxonomy of the existing contributions is provided to frame them in a common reference scheme and a model is developed to encompass such contributions and discuss their main findings. Papers that investigate the investment problem of an isolated firm are distinguished from those that consider interdependent firms. In turn, interdependent cybersecurity is analyzed in three different contexts: (i) firms that operate their business via a common computer network, but are not competitors in the product market; (ii) firms that are competitors in the product market, but run their business using non-interconnected computer systems; (iii) firms that are competitors and rely on a common computer network. Promising avenues for future research are discussed in the conclusions.
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المؤلفون: Maria Grazia Romano
المصدر: Southern Economic Journal. 88:56-78
مصطلحات موضوعية: Microeconomics, Economics and Econometrics, Incentive, R&D, hidden information, product market competition, Economics, Competitive pressure
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المؤلفون: Xiang Ji, Zhixin Chen, Jie Wu, Ruixia Shi, Shijian Hong
المصدر: Annals of Operations Research. 310:27-47
مصطلحات موضوعية: Commerce, Incentive, Product market, Supply chain, Control (management), General Decision Sciences, Business, Management Science and Operations Research, Dual (category theory)
الوصف: The emergence of online retail platforms and new retail technologies have enabled retailers to sell refurbished products to different markets, which exposes manufacturers to new challenges to control refurbished product market. This study investigates the incentives of supply chain members for refurbished products in a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the conditions under which the retailer is willing to sell refurbished products and the impact of refurbished products on manufacturer’s profits in three different cases, i.e., local market selling, across market selling, and dual market selling. Our results reveal that the manufacturer can effectively control the selling of refurbished products by a wholesale price contract when the retailer can only deliver refurbished products to her local market. However, when the retailer has the ability to deliver refurbished products into a cross-border market, supply chain members encounter different incentives for refurbished products.
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8Technology improvement strategy for green products under competition: The role of government subsidy
المؤلفون: Wansheng Tang, Rui Yang, Jianxiong Zhang
المصدر: European Journal of Operational Research. 289:553-568
مصطلحات موضوعية: 050210 logistics & transportation, Government, 021103 operations research, Information Systems and Management, Supply chain management, General Computer Science, Product market, 05 social sciences, 0211 other engineering and technologies, Subsidy, 02 engineering and technology, Management Science and Operations Research, Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering, Dilemma, Competition (economics), Incentive, Modeling and Simulation, 0502 economics and business, Business, Game theory, Industrial organization
الوصف: Nowadays, the growing global concerns about sustainable issues have placed high pressure on firms to improve production technology and reduce energy consumption. However, firm’s incentive may be weakened due to high costs. The government has recognized the firms’ predicament and provided financial support to incentivize them to improve technology. This study builds a game model which consists of a government and two competing firms to investigate the equilibrium solutions that the two symmetric firms can reach on their technology improvement strategies, and analyze the role of government subsidy. Results show that both firms apply the existing technology when it is obviously costly to improve technology, and both improve technology when the benefit of market expansion is relatively large, while they reach an asymmetric equilibrium with one improving technology and the other not when the cost and the market expansion associated with improving technology can match each other. Besides, the two firms may trap into a prisoner’s dilemma when they reach the equilibrium of both improving the technology. Encouragingly, government subsidy can serve as an effective way to alleviate the prisoner’s dilemma by easing firms’ financial burden for technology improvement. In addition, government subsidy is conducive to expanding the green product market and improving the social welfare. Finally, government subsidy may improve both firms’ profits except for the firm applying the existing technology in the asymmetric equilibrium when the cost of improving technology is moderate.
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المؤلفون: Mark Bagnoli, Susan G. Watts
المصدر: The Accounting Review. 96:29-46
مصطلحات موضوعية: Voluntary disclosure, Economics and Econometrics, Public information, Incentive, Product market, business.industry, Accounting, Value (economics), ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY, business, Private information retrieval, Finance
الوصف: Public information that becomes available after a manager's initial voluntary disclosure decision creates incentives for her to reconsider and possibly change that decision. We show that if she has private information that is value-relevant or that impacts the firm's ability to compete in its product market, the option to revise an initial disclosure decision in the face of a public release of information alters both the initial decision and the overall frequency of disclosure. These effects are amplified if she believes that public information arrival is more likely or if the firm's value is more sensitive to it. We also show that an increase in the initial disclosure cost reduces the probability of an initial disclosure and increases the probability of a subsequent disclosure. These effects are reversed if the cost of a subsequent disclosure increases.
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b134809c36a9db71bcc8719ad67bef2a
https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2017-0176 -
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المؤلفون: Yu Liu, Hussein Abdoh
المصدر: Financial Review. 56:133-156
مصطلحات موضوعية: Microeconomics, Competition (economics), Economics and Econometrics, 050208 finance, Incentive, Product market, Investment efficiency, Return volatility, 0502 economics and business, 05 social sciences, Economics, 050207 economics, Finance
الوصف: Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance.
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