مصطلحات موضوعية: Pareto optimality, d71 - "Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations", Inequality, Justice, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, resource allocation, fairness, single-dipped preferences, d63 - Equity

الوصف: One unit of an infinitely divisible and non-disposable commodity has to be allocated among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. We combine Pareto optimality with equal treatment of equals, the equal division lower bound, the equal division core, envy-freeness, and group envy-freeness. For each of these fairness requirements, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for compatibility with Pareto optimality and we characterize all corresponding allocations for each preference profile.

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::a0ebe44ecd64dd35f1f68caf77184fb1
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2023009

مصطلحات موضوعية: Young's rules, claims problems, d71 - "Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations", Inequality, d74 - "Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances", consistency, Social Choice, Associations, Justice, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, Conflict, Alliances, Equity, partial-implementation invariance, d63 - Equity

الوصف: In the context of claims problems, we formulate an invariance axiom of a rule with respect to its “partial implementation”: having applied the rule to a problem and distributed their awards to some of the claimants, we consider the problem obtained by setting the claims of these claimants equal to zero and decreasing the endowment by the sum of their awards; we require that in this problem the rule assigns to each remaining claimant the same amount as it did initially. We formulate several variants of this requirement of “partial-implementation invariance” and a “converse” of it. We investigate how it relates to known axioms and ask whether it is preserved under certain “operators” that have been defined on the space of rules. Our main result is a fixed-population characterization of a family of rules introduced and characterized by Young (1987) in a variable-population framework, known as the “parametric rules”.

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________83::0a950da8606714ab67c4e2b069fb4b11
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/a889c210-ebcc-41d6-80b4-1559083114b4

مصطلحات موضوعية: Young's rules, claims problems, d71 - "Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations", Inequality, d74 - "Conflict, Conflict Resolution, Alliances", consistency, Justice, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, partial-implementation invariance, d63 - Equity

الوصف: In the context of claims problems, we formulate an invariance axiom of a rule with respect to its “partial implementation”: having applied the rule to a problem and distributed their awards to some of the claimants, we consider the problem obtained by setting the claims of these claimants equal to zero and decreasing the endowment by the sum of their awards; we require that in this problem the rule assigns to each remaining claimant the same amount as it did initially. We formulate several variants of this requirement of “partial-implementation invariance” and a “converse” of it. We investigate how it relates to known axioms and ask whether it is preserved under certain “operators” that have been defined on the space of rules. Our main result is a fixed-population characterization of a family of rules introduced and characterized by Young (1987) in a variable-population framework, known as the “parametric rules”.

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::e4b96c5cea1389c62302901a3dc1b16c
https://doi.org/10.26481/umagsb.2023002

مصطلحات موضوعية: d71 - "Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations", Inequality, efficiency, money metric utility, d61 - "Allocative Efficiency, Cost-Benefit Analysis", Justice, i31 - General Welfare, transfer principle, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, d63 - Equity

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::6a0e0115cb47249ff8fa18958268ba88
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2874195

مصطلحات موضوعية: Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations, d61 - "Allocative Efficiency, Cost-Benefit Analysis", Justice, i31 - General Welfare, transfer principle, Equity, d63 - Equity, Allocative Efficiency, Cost-Benefit Analysis, d71 - "Social Choice, Associations", Inequality, efficiency, money metric utility, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement, General Welfare

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________83::66614ae7d7569a88da2f061aa89b32eb
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/52973446-d0dd-43e9-9e92-52a0ecb49b54