المؤلفون: Dahm, Matthias, Dur, Robert, Glazer, Amihai

المصدر: Public Choice, 2014 Apr 01. 159(1/2), 63-82.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24507660

المؤلفون: Bucovetsky, Sam, Glazer, Amihai

المصدر: Public Choice, 2009 Jan 01. 138(1/2), 3-8.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40270827

المؤلفون: Glazer, Amihai

المصدر: Public Choice, 2006 Mar 01. 126(3/4), 453-463.

URL الوصول: https://www.jstor.org/stable/30026763

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المؤلفون: Dahm, Matthias, Dur, Robert, Glazer, Amihai

مصطلحات موضوعية: D72, Interessenpolitik, Glaubwürdigkeit, voting, Wahlverhalten, ddc:330, D78, special interests, lobbying, Betriebliche Standortwahl, Theorie, credibility

الوصف: This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, so each legislator who seeks the firm's investment votes for the policy, though all legislators would be better off if they all voted against the policy. Moreover, when votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible. Unlike influence mechanisms based on contributions or bribes, the behavior considered is time consistent and in line with the observed small spending by special interests.

URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od______1687::2ba01864c30719d53af85c8763979f0a
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57959