نتائج البحث - "economía extractiva"

المصدر: Apuntes del CENES, Vol 38, Iss 67, Pp 227-250 (2019)
RiUPTC: Repositorio Institucional UPTC
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
instacron:Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
Apuntes del Cenes, Volume: 38, Issue: 67, Pages: 227-250, Published: JUN 2019

مصطلحات موضوعية: Cultural Studies, History, corrupção, Fluctuaciones y ciclos económicos, Extracción de recursos naturales, diferencias en diferencias, Literature and Literary Theory, extraction of natural resources, corruption, Industria minera - Aspectos sociales - Colombia, corrupción, Crecimiento económico, Diferencias en diferencias, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, differences in differences, flutuações nos negócios, extracción de recursos naturales, 050207 economics, Corrupción, HB71-74, extração de recursos naturais, business fluctuations, Industria minera - Aspectos económicos - Colombia, Recursos naturales - Explotación, 05 social sciences, Economía extractiva, diferenças nas diferenças, Ciclos económicos, 0506 political science, Economics as a science, fluctuaciones y ciclos económicos

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5

Corrupción, Transparencia y Recursos Naturales

المؤلفون: Purroy Vitola, Miguel Eduardo

المساهمون: Prem, Mounu, Vargas, Juan F.

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