التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Green Agricultural Products Supply Chain Subsidy Scheme with Green Traceability and Data-Driven Marketing of the Platform. |
| المؤلفون: |
Wang X; School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China., Zhang J; School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China., Ma D; School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China., Sun H; School of Business, Qingdao University, Qingdao 266071, China. |
| المصدر: |
International journal of environmental research and public health [Int J Environ Res Public Health] 2023 Feb 09; Vol. 20 (4). Date of Electronic Publication: 2023 Feb 09. |
| نوع المنشور: |
Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't |
| اللغة: |
English |
| بيانات الدورية: |
Publisher: MDPI Country of Publication: Switzerland NLM ID: 101238455 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1660-4601 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 16604601 NLM ISO Abbreviation: Int J Environ Res Public Health Subsets: MEDLINE |
| أسماء مطبوعة: |
Original Publication: Basel : MDPI, c2004- |
| مواضيع طبية MeSH: |
Commerce* , Marketing*, Cost Sharing ; Consumer Behavior ; Financing, Government |
| مستخلص: |
Government subsidies have played an important role in the development of green agriculture. In addition, the Internet platform is becoming a new channel to realize green traceability and promote the sale of agricultural products. In this context, we consider a two-level green agricultural products supply chain (GAPSC) consisting of one supplier and one Internet platform. The supplier makes green R&D investments to produce green agricultural products along with conventional agricultural products, and the platform implements green traceability and data-driven marketing. The differential game models are established under four government subsidy scenarios: no subsidy (NS), consumer subsidy (CS), supplier subsidy (SS), and supplier subsidy with green traceability cost-sharing (TSS). Then, the optimal feedback strategies under each subsidy scenario are derived using Bellman's continuous dynamic programming theory. The comparative static analyses of key parameters are given, and the comparisons among different subsidy scenarios are conducted. Numerical examples are employed to obtain more management insights. The results show that the CS strategy is effective only if the competition intensity between two types of products is below a certain threshold. Compared to the NS scenario, the SS strategy can always improve the supplier's green R&D level, the greenness level, market demand for green agricultural products, and the system's utility. The TSS strategy can build on the SS strategy to further enhance the green traceability level of the platform and the greenness level and demand for green agricultural products due to the advantage of the cost-sharing mechanism. Accordingly, a win-win situation for both parties can be realized under the TSS strategy. However, the positive effect of the cost-sharing mechanism will be weakened as the supplier subsidy increases. Moreover, compared to three other scenarios, the increase in the environmental concern of the platform has a more significant negative impact on the TSS strategy. |
| References: |
Appetite. 2019 Oct 1;141:104273. (PMID: 31150771) |
| فهرسة مساهمة: |
Keywords: data-driven marketing; differential game; green agricultural products supply chain; green subsidy; platform traceability |
| تواريخ الأحداث: |
Date Created: 20230225 Date Completed: 20230228 Latest Revision: 20231119 |
| رمز التحديث: |
20231119 |
| مُعرف محوري في PubMed: |
PMC9960969 |
| DOI: |
10.3390/ijerph20043056 |
| PMID: |
36833775 |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
MEDLINE |
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