التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Do Directors Respond to Stock Mispricing? Evidence from CEO Turnovers. |
| المؤلفون: |
Goldman, Jim |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis; Sep2023, Vol. 58 Issue 6, p2732-2751, 20p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
CORPORATE directors, STOCK prices, MANAGEMENT turnover, CHIEF executive officers, PRICING, CAREER development, STOCKHOLDERS, DECISION making in business |
| مستخلص: |
This article examines whether and how stock mispricing can affect the probability of CEO turnover. In a sample of 1,573 US public firms, I find that, after controlling for fundamental performance, a 1-standard-deviation negative uninformative stock price shock increases the likelihood of CEO turnover by 10%. The mispricing-turnover sensitivity is stronger at firms with an independent board, and a difference-in-difference analysis further supports that finding. Ancillary results suggest that independent directors' career concerns may play a role in the response of independent boards to mispricing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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