التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Financial guarantors’ executive compensation, charter value and risk-taking. |
| المؤلفون: |
Lai, Van Son, Soumaré, Issouf, Sun, Yan |
| المصدر: |
Research in International Business & Finance; Aug2012, Vol. 26 Issue 3, p387-397, 11p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
EXECUTIVE compensation, SURETYSHIP & guaranty, RISK-taking behavior, SURETY & fidelity insurance, SELF-control, STOCKHOLDERS, CONFLICT of interests |
| مستخلص: |
Abstract: Financial guarantees have been extensively used recently as part of rescue packages to bail out troubled institutions and governments around the world. We propose a new incentive compensation model for studying agency conflict between the shareholders and the manager of a typical financial guarantor. In our model, the manager chooses the guarantor''s risk level, with disutility to reduce risk (i.e., reducing the risk of the guarantor incurs a direct cost to the manager). Moral hazard causes the manager to select a level of risk that is higher than the level chosen in an otherwise first-best environment with no conflict of interest between the shareholders and the manager. However, in our proposed framework, charter value plays a self-disciplining role on the manager''s appetite for risk, therefore it helps mitigate the extent of the deviation from first best with agency conflict found previously (e.g., ). This suggests that researchers should study charter value, managerial compensation and risk decisions within a unified framework and not separately, as all studies have done in the past. [Copyright &y& Elsevier] |
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