Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects
المؤلفون: Yilong Han, Wei Xiong
المصدر: IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 70:2220-2232
بيانات النشر: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2023.
سنة النشر: 2023
مصطلحات موضوعية: Finance, Public–private partnership, Incentive, business.industry, Strategy and Management, General partnership, Contract theory, Take over, Electrical and Electronic Engineering, business, Private sector, Compensation (engineering)
الوصف: Public–private partnership (PPP) projects often end in early termination and the governments must compensate private-sector partners and take over project assets. Based on multicountry experience, this article proposes a systematic approach on when and how to compensate efficiently and fairly. A compensation model was first developed to quantify the amount paid to the private-sector partners when early termination occurs, and built upon that, an incentive model was proposed to analyze the incentives of both contracting parties. We then testified our propositions through two realistic cases. In line with the incomplete contract theory and the reference point theory, the findings demonstrate that the proposed compensation method increases the the private sector's incentives of relationship-specific investments, but discourages its efforts to prevent early termination in serious risk scenarios. This article not only contributes to the theoretical development of PPPs on contract design and incentive mechanisms, but also offers solutions for practitioners in the early termination of PPP projects.
تدمد: 1558-0040
0018-9391
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5d4d8d52187c5822c611f48d9d39a6de
https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3074662
حقوق: CLOSED
رقم الأكسشن: edsair.doi...........5d4d8d52187c5822c611f48d9d39a6de
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE