Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets
| العنوان: | Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets |
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| المؤلفون: | Amihai Glazer, Kimiko Terai |
| المصدر: | Journal of Theoretical Politics. 30:388-409 |
| بيانات النشر: | SAGE Publications, 2018. |
| سنة النشر: | 2018 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Sociology and Political Science, Delegation, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Principal (computer security), 0506 political science, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, 050602 political science & public administration, Business, 050207 economics, Rivalry, Reputation, media_common |
| الوصف: | An agent competing for resources from a principal may benefit from having the principal believe that the agent shares his preferences, whereas the principal may prefer that agents reveal their types, inducing a separating equilibrium. Such incentives are explored in a model with a principal who sets a budget in two separate periods, and two different agents allocate that budget among services. In the second period, the principal allocates a larger budget to the agent that he believes is more likely to share his preferences. In the first period, each agent may behave strategically, spending more on the service the principal prefers, thereby hiding the agent’s type; this benefits the principal in the current period, but hurts him in the future because he does not know which agent would spend in the way he prefers. The principal may induce separation by giving the agents a large budget in the initial period, or by hiding his preferences from them. |
| تدمد: | 1460-3667 0951-6298 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ac522758a56870961eb5068373a8fd81 https://doi.org/10.1177/0951629818791029 |
| حقوق: | CLOSED |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi...........ac522758a56870961eb5068373a8fd81 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 14603667 09516298 |
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