Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications
المؤلفون: Xoan Hoang, Sang-Ho Lee, Sumi Cho
المصدر: Australian Economic Papers. 58:480-497
بيانات النشر: Wiley, 2019.
سنة النشر: 2019
مصطلحات موضوعية: Commercial policy, 050208 finance, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Social entrepreneurship, Tariff, Outcome (game theory), Market structure, Market economy, 0502 economics and business, Corporate social responsibility, Business, 050207 economics, General Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Welfare, Timing game, media_common
الوصف: This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyzes strategic trade policy toward a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm’s leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm’s leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm’s leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous-timing game, we show that a simultaneous-move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm’s leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviors between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.
تدمد: 1467-8454
0004-900X
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f3de3e9debcea57e35bf2d8efdd04125
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.12164
حقوق: OPEN
رقم الأكسشن: edsair.doi...........f3de3e9debcea57e35bf2d8efdd04125
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE