Gradual College Admission *
| العنوان: | Gradual College Admission * |
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| المؤلفون: | Vincent Iehlé, Guillaume Haeringer |
| المساهمون: | Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College [CUNY], City University of New York [New York] (CUNY)-City University of New York [New York] (CUNY), Centre de Recherche en Economie Appliquée à la Mondialisation (CREAM), Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société (IRIHS), Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Université de Rouen Normandie (UNIROUEN), Normandie Université (NU), ANR-13-BSH1-0010,DynaMITE,Appariements et Interactions Dynamiques : Théorie et Expériences(2013), Normandie Université (NU)-Normandie Université (NU)-Institut de Recherche Interdisciplinaire Homme et Société (IRIHS) |
| المصدر: | Journal of Economic Theory Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, 2021, 198 (105378), ⟨10.1016/j.jet.2021.105378⟩ |
| بيانات النشر: | HAL CCSD, 2021. |
| سنة النشر: | 2021 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Matching (statistics), JEL classification: C78, Computer science, [SHS.EDU]Humanities and Social Sciences/Education, Stability (learning theory), JEL: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory, French college admissions system, Early admission, [SHS]Humanities and Social Sciences, 0502 economics and business, school choice problem, Operations management, D02 gradual matching, [INFO]Computer Science [cs], 050207 economics, gradual matching, early admission, 050205 econometrics, [QFIN]Quantitative Finance [q-fin], withdrawal, 4. Education, 05 social sciences, multi-period matching, 050301 education, JEL: I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I2 - Education and Research Institutions/I.I2.I23 - Higher Education • Research Institutions, stability, [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance, two-sided matching, 050206 economic theory, 0503 education |
| الوصف: | International audience; We study multi-period college admission problems where, at each period, a matching is computed and students have the option to either finalize their matches or participate to the next period. Students participating to an additional run of the matching mechanism can submit a new rank order list to the matching clearinghouse. Such gradual matching systems can adequately account for an additional source of heterogeneity among participants, like withdrawals. We identify the conditions under which such systems first ensure that participating to additional runs of the matching mechanism is safe for participants (in the sense that they can secure the spot they obtained at the previous round) and second yield to stable matchings (with a stability concept adapted to this environment). We use our results to evaluate the former French college admission system, where students could finalize their matches at different dates up to two months ahead the end of the admission campaign. |
| اللغة: | English |
| تدمد: | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7970b7afb9c0475718e6e0d35537b0e8 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02330435 |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi.dedup.....7970b7afb9c0475718e6e0d35537b0e8 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 00220531 10957235 |
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