تقرير
Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis
| العنوان: | Voting power in the Council of the European Union: A comprehensive sensitivity analysis |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Petróczy, Dóra Gréta, Csató, László |
| سنة النشر: | 2023 |
| المجموعة: | Computer Science Physics (Other) |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Physics - Physics and Society, Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Economics - Theoretical Economics, 91A80, 91B12 |
| الوصف: | The Council of the European Union (EU) is one of the main decision-making bodies of the EU. Many decisions require a qualified majority: the support of 55% of the member states (currently 15) that represent at least 65% of the total population. We investigate how the power distribution, based on the Shapley-Shubik index, and the proportion of winning coalitions change if these criteria are modified within reasonable bounds. The power of the two countries with about 4% of the total population each is found to be almost flat. The level of decisiveness decreases if the population criterion is above 68\% or the states criterion is at least 17. The proportion of winning coalitions can be increased from 13.2% to 20.8% (30.1%) such that the maximal relative change in the Shapley-Shubik indices remains below 3.5% (5.5%). Our results are indispensable to evaluate any proposal for reforming the qualified majority voting system. Comment: 22 pages, 7 figures, 3 tables |
| نوع الوثيقة: | Working Paper |
| URL الوصول: | http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.16878 |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsarx.2312.16878 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | arXiv |
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