تقرير
Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance
العنوان: | Winner-Pays-Bid Auctions Minimize Variance |
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المؤلفون: | McAfee, Preston, Leme, Renato Paes, Sivan, Balasubramanian, Vassilvitskii, Sergei |
سنة النشر: | 2024 |
المجموعة: | Computer Science |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory |
الوصف: | Any social choice function (e.g the efficient allocation) can be implemented using different payment rules: first price, second price, all-pay, etc. All of these payment rules are guaranteed to have the same expected revenue by the revenue equivalence theorem, but have different distributions of revenue, leading to a question of which one is best. We prove that among all possible payment rules, winner-pays-bid minimizes the variance in revenue and, in fact, minimizes any convex risk measure. |
نوع الوثيقة: | Working Paper |
URL الوصول: | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.04856 |
رقم الأكسشن: | edsarx.2403.04856 |
قاعدة البيانات: | arXiv |
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