تقرير
Port Forwarding Services Are Forwarding Security Risks
العنوان: | Port Forwarding Services Are Forwarding Security Risks |
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المؤلفون: | Wang, Haoyuan, Xue, Yue, Feng, Xuan, Zhou, Chao, Mi, Xianghang |
سنة النشر: | 2024 |
المجموعة: | Computer Science |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | Computer Science - Cryptography and Security |
الوصف: | We conduct the first comprehensive security study on representative port forwarding services (PFS), which emerge in recent years and make the web services deployed in internal networks available on the Internet along with better usability but less complexity compared to traditional techniques (e.g., NAT traversal techniques). Our study is made possible through a set of novel methodologies, which are designed to uncover the technical mechanisms of PFS, experiment attack scenarios for PFS protocols, automatically discover and snapshot port-forwarded websites (PFWs) at scale, and classify PFWs into well-observed categories. Leveraging these methodologies, we have observed the widespread adoption of PFS with millions of PFWs distributed across tens of thousands of ISPs worldwide. Furthermore, 32.31% PFWs have been classified into website categories that serve access to critical data or infrastructure, such as, web consoles for industrial control systems, IoT controllers, code repositories, and office automation systems. And 18.57% PFWs didn't enforce any access control for external visitors. Also identified are two types of attacks inherent in the protocols of Oray (one well-adopted PFS provider), and the notable abuse of PFSes by malicious actors in activities such as malware distribution, botnet operation and phishing. |
نوع الوثيقة: | Working Paper |
URL الوصول: | http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.16060 |
رقم الأكسشن: | edsarx.2403.16060 |
قاعدة البيانات: | arXiv |
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