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Does the random inspection reduce audit opinion shopping?

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Does the random inspection reduce audit opinion shopping?
المؤلفون: Guoqing Zhang, Sicen Chen, Pengdong Zhang, Xiaowei Lin
المصدر: China Journal of Accounting Studies, Vol 10, Iss 4, Pp 528-548 (2022)
بيانات النشر: Taylor & Francis Group, 2022.
سنة النشر: 2022
المجموعة: LCC:Accounting. Bookkeeping
LCC:Finance
مصطلحات موضوعية: Random inspection, audit opinion shopping, audit independence, Accounting. Bookkeeping, HF5601-5689, Finance, HG1-9999
الوصف: The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has randomly selected two audit firms each year to check their problems in management and internal control since 2016. Using the random inspections from 2016 to 2018, we construct a staggered DID model and find that the possibility of audit firms engaging in audit opinion shopping decreases after they are inspected. To explore the underlying logic, we document that: (1) the random inspections strengthened audit firms’ management of branch offices, resulting in a more pronounced effect on the practice of branch audit offices; and (2) the policy improved audit firms’ internal control, leading to more pronounced effect in audit firms with a heavy workload and loose control. Further, we show that punishments following the inspections strengthen the basic effect, while the effect of random inspections would be weakened for the big 10 audit firms.
نوع الوثيقة: article
وصف الملف: electronic resource
اللغة: English
تدمد: 21697213
2169-7221
2169-7213
Relation: https://doaj.org/toc/2169-7213; https://doaj.org/toc/2169-7221
DOI: 10.1080/21697213.2022.2143685
URL الوصول: https://doaj.org/article/8f20f2b91af54431946502fe743b49a0
رقم الأكسشن: edsdoj.8f20f2b91af54431946502fe743b49a0
قاعدة البيانات: Directory of Open Access Journals
الوصف
تدمد:21697213
21697221
DOI:10.1080/21697213.2022.2143685