التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Implications of a Reserve Price in an Agent-Based Common-Value Auction |
| المؤلفون: |
Christopher Boyer, B. Brorsen |
| المصدر: |
Springer;Society for Computational Economics, Computational Economics. 43(1):33-51 |
| سنة النشر: |
2014 |
| الوصف: |
Auction sellers can use a reserve price to require a minimum bid before items are sold. Theoretical and experimental research has tested the influence of a reserve price in an independent private values auction, but little focus has been given to the influence of a reserve price in a first-price common-value auction. We establish an agent-based first-price common-value auction to determine the impact of the reserve price with two buyers and with three buyers. An agent-based approach to this problem is both a unique contribution to the literature and appropriate since finding analytical solutions with common-value auctions is difficult. The agent-based model approach also allows us to consider buyers that have non-symmetric bid functions. Furthermore, we introduce a combination of numerical integration techniques with a new particle swarm learning algorithm. The buyers in the model choose their expected-net-revenue-maximizing bid price, and sellers choose their expected-revenue-maximizing reserve price. In the two-buyer and three-buyer auction, a reserve price increases the equilibrium winning bid price, decreases the probability that the item is sold, and increases the seller’s expected revenue. A reserve price in a two-buyer auction increases the winning bid price more than including an additional buyer in the auction with no reserve price. However, due to only receiving a salvage value when the item does not sell in the auction, the seller’s expected revenue is higher in the three-buyer first-price common-value auction without a reserve price than in the two-buyer auction with a reserve price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014 |
| نوع الوثيقة: |
redif-article |
| اللغة: |
English |
| DOI: |
10.1007/s10614-013-9413-8 |
| الإتاحة: |
https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/compec/v43y2014i1p33-51.html |
| رقم الأكسشن: |
edsrep.a.kap.compec.v43y2014i1p33.51 |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
RePEc |
