التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach |
| المؤلفون: |
Christopher Boyer, B. Brorsen, Tong Zhang |
| المصدر: |
Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination. 9(1):129-149 |
| سنة النشر: |
2014 |
| الوصف: |
Previous theoretical work has compared a private-value auction and posted-price market, and an affiliated-value auction and a posted-price market to determine the selling method preferred by sellers. Much less, however, is known about the seller’s preferred selling method when the buyers have a common value of the item. Our objective is to determine if a first-price auction or a posted-price market provides a seller with the larger expected revenue when buyers have a common value of the item being sold. An agent-based posted-price market and an agent-based first-price common-value auction with a reserve price are developed to compare these selling methods. Holding the buyers’ uncertainty about the value of the item constant, the seller prefers the posted-price market when the seller has no uncertainty about the item’s value. When the seller has an equal level of uncertainty as the buyers, the seller’s expected revenue for each market is similar. As the seller’s uncertainty increases beyond the level of the buyers’ uncertainty, the auction with a reserve price eventually becomes the preferred choice. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014 |
| نوع الوثيقة: |
redif-article |
| اللغة: |
English |
| DOI: |
10.1007/s11403-013-0115-z |
| الإتاحة: |
https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jeicoo/v9y2014i1p129-149.html |
| رقم الأكسشن: |
edsrep.a.spr.jeicoo.v9y2014i1p129.149 |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
RePEc |
