دورية أكاديمية
Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games.
| العنوان: | Cooperators trade off ecological resilience and evolutionary stability in public goods games. |
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| المؤلفون: | Rauch J; Department of Physics and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Brandeis University, 405 South Street, Waltham, MA 02542, USA jwrauch@brandeis.edu.; The Rowland Institute, Harvard University, 100 Edwin Land Blvd, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA., Kondev J; Department of Physics and Howard Hughes Medical Institute, Brandeis University, 405 South Street, Waltham, MA 02542, USA., Sanchez A; The Rowland Institute, Harvard University, 100 Edwin Land Blvd, Cambridge, MA 02142, USA alvaro.sanchez@yale.edu.; Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520, USA.; Microbial Sciences Institute, Yale University, West Haven, CT 06516, USA. |
| المصدر: | Journal of the Royal Society, Interface [J R Soc Interface] 2017 Feb; Vol. 14 (127). |
| نوع المنشور: | Journal Article; Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't |
| اللغة: | English |
| بيانات الدورية: | Publisher: Royal Society Country of Publication: England NLM ID: 101217269 Publication Model: Print Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1742-5662 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 17425662 NLM ISO Abbreviation: J R Soc Interface Subsets: MEDLINE |
| أسماء مطبوعة: | Original Publication: London : Royal Society, [2004]- |
| مواضيع طبية MeSH: | Biological Evolution* , Game Theory* , Models, Biological* |
| مستخلص: | Microbial populations often rely on the cooperative production of extracellular 'public goods' molecules. The cooperative nature of public good production may lead to minimum viable population sizes, below which populations collapse. In addition, 'cooperator' public goods producing individuals face evolutionary competition from non-producing mutants, or 'freeloaders'. Thus, public goods cooperators should be resilient not only to the invasion of freeloaders, but also to ecological perturbations that may push their populations below a sustainable threshold. Through a mathematical analysis of the Ecological Public Goods Game, we show that game parameters that improve the cooperating population's stability to freeloader invasion also lead to a low ecological resilience. Complex regulatory strategies mimicking those used by microbes in nature may allow cooperators to beat this trade-off and become evolutionarily stable to invading freeloaders while at the same time maximizing their ecological resilience. Our results thus identify the coupling between resilience to evolutionary and ecological challenges as a key factor for the long-term viability of public goods cooperators. (© 2017 The Author(s).) |
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| فهرسة مساهمة: | Keywords: cooperation; ecological resilience; evolutionary game theory; evolutionary stability; public goods |
| سلسلة جزيئية: | figshare 10.6084/m9.figshare.c.3670198 |
| تواريخ الأحداث: | Date Created: 20170203 Date Completed: 20171030 Latest Revision: 20181113 |
| رمز التحديث: | 20221213 |
| مُعرف محوري في PubMed: | PMC5332582 |
| DOI: | 10.1098/rsif.2016.0967 |
| PMID: | 28148770 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | MEDLINE |
| تدمد: | 1742-5662 |
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| DOI: | 10.1098/rsif.2016.0967 |