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Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus.

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Who resists belief-biased inferences? The role of individual differences in reasoning strategies, working memory, and attentional focus.
المؤلفون: de Chantal PL; Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montreal, Montréal, QC, Canada. pldechantal@gmail.com., Newman IR; Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada., Thompson V; Department of Psychology, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada., Markovits H; Department of Psychology, Université du Québec à Montreal, Montréal, QC, Canada.
المصدر: Memory & cognition [Mem Cognit] 2020 May; Vol. 48 (4), pp. 655-671.
نوع المنشور: Journal Article; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
اللغة: English
بيانات الدورية: Publisher: Psychonomic Society Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 0357443 Publication Model: Print Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 1532-5946 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 0090502X NLM ISO Abbreviation: Mem Cognit Subsets: MEDLINE
أسماء مطبوعة: Original Publication: Austin Tx Psychonomic Society
مواضيع طبية MeSH: Individuality* , Memory, Short-Term*, Attention ; Cognition ; Humans ; Problem Solving
مستخلص: A common explanation for individual differences in the ability to draw rule-based inferences, when a putative conclusion suggests a competing belief-based inference, is that the ability to do so depends on working memory capacity. In the following studies, we examined the hypothesis that the ability to draw rule-based inferences in belief bias tasks can also be explained by individual differences in reasoning strategies and in the related attentional focus. The dual-strategy model differentiates counterexample and statistical strategies that involve different information-processing styles. In the first study (N = 139), participants completed a working memory task (operation span), a strategy diagnostic questionnaire, and a belief bias task. The results showed that individual differences in strategy use predicted performance in the belief bias problems over and above any effects of working memory capacity, with counterexample reasoners producing rule-based inferences more often than statistical reasoners. In the second study (N = 196), an eye-tracking methodology was used as a process-tracing technique to investigate attentional differences between the two strategies. On problems showing a conflict between rule-based and belief-based information, counterexample reasoners demonstrated longer fixation times on the premises than did statistical reasoners, thus providing direct evidence that individual differences in strategy use reflect different processing styles. These results clearly indicate that individual differences in strategy use are an important determinant of the way that people make inferences when rule-based and belief-based cues are both present.
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فهرسة مساهمة: Keywords: Attention; Belief bias; Eye tracking; Individual differences; Reasoning strategies; Working memory
تواريخ الأحداث: Date Created: 20191204 Date Completed: 20210728 Latest Revision: 20220921
رمز التحديث: 20221213
DOI: 10.3758/s13421-019-00998-2
PMID: 31792857
قاعدة البيانات: MEDLINE
الوصف
تدمد:1532-5946
DOI:10.3758/s13421-019-00998-2