دورية أكاديمية
Relationship of pay-for-performance and provider pay.
| العنوان: | Relationship of pay-for-performance and provider pay. |
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| المؤلفون: | Shurson L; University of Arizona, College of Nursing, Tucson, Arizona., Gregg SR |
| المصدر: | Journal of the American Association of Nurse Practitioners [J Am Assoc Nurse Pract] 2019 Dec 04; Vol. 33 (1), pp. 11-19. Date of Electronic Publication: 2019 Dec 04. |
| نوع المنشور: | Journal Article |
| اللغة: | English |
| بيانات الدورية: | Publisher: Wolters Kluwer Country of Publication: United States NLM ID: 101600770 Publication Model: Electronic Cited Medium: Internet ISSN: 2327-6924 (Electronic) Linking ISSN: 23276886 NLM ISO Abbreviation: J Am Assoc Nurse Pract |
| أسماء مطبوعة: | Publication: 2018- : Netherlands : Wolters Kluwer Original Publication: Malden : Wiley |
| مواضيع طبية MeSH: | Health Personnel/*economics , Reimbursement, Incentive/*statistics & numerical data , Salaries and Fringe Benefits/*statistics & numerical data, Health Personnel/statistics & numerical data ; Humans ; Quality of Health Care/economics ; Quality of Health Care/statistics & numerical data ; Reimbursement Mechanisms/economics |
| مستخلص: | Background: Policymakers and health care leaders search for a payment model to balance the interests of providers, patients, and payers. This has shifted reimbursement from a fee-for-service (FFS) to pay-for-performance (P4P) model. The FFS model of reimbursement may lead to provider overuse. The P4P model incentivizes quality, not quantity, of care. However, the payer's reimbursement shift to P4P has not affected compensation of individual providers. Objectives: To explore the effects of payment compensation models on provider behavior and employment. Data Sources: CINAHL, Cochrane, and EBSCO databases were searched. To ensure accuracy, a PRISMA flow diagram was used. A thematic analysis was performed using 52 articles. Conclusions: Four themes emerged: health care as an economic anomaly, the ability to incentivize value, ethics, and provider-employer-payer alignment. Basic economic principles are distorted in health care because of payment layers and competing goals. Although payment structure affects health care provider (HCP) performance, the correlation is not understood. There is a lack of knowledge on several key areas: 1) HCP behavioral research, 2) how employment may be influencing existing HCP attitudes and actions, 3) how nurse practitioners (NPs) differ from physicians, and 4) P4P outcome data. There is also a lack of literature involving NP's and reimbursement. Implications for Practice: Nurse practitioners must be included in compensation model research. Payment reform should address all individual HCP compensation. Reforms will be limited if focus remains on payer-organization reform and ignores HCP compensation. As HCPs, it is imperative to understand how payers reimburse services to establish guiding principles for equitable and ethical compensation negotiations. Competing Interests: Competing interests: The authors report no conflicts of interest. (Copyright © 2019 American Association of Nurse Practitioners.) |
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| تواريخ الأحداث: | Date Created: 20191207 Date Completed: 20210727 Latest Revision: 20230821 |
| رمز التحديث: | 20240628 |
| DOI: | 10.1097/JXX.0000000000000343 |
| PMID: | 31809401 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | MEDLINE |
| تدمد: | 2327-6924 |
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| DOI: | 10.1097/JXX.0000000000000343 |