التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Does Board Independence Increase Firm Value? Evidence from Closed-End Funds. |
| المؤلفون: |
Souther, Matthew E. |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis; Feb2021, Vol. 56 Issue 1, p313-336, 24p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
BOARDS of directors, CORPORATE autonomy, ENTERPRISE value, CORPORATE governance, SELECTION & appointment of corporate directors, CLOSED-end funds |
| مستخلص: |
Researchers disagree about the impact of board independence on firm value. The disagreement generally stems from the endogenous nature of board appointments. I add new evidence to this discussion by using a sample of closed-end funds to document the value-enhancing effects of independent boards. Using cross-sectional, difference-in-differences, and instrumental variables techniques, I address these endogeneity concerns and find consistent evidence that board independence is associated with higher firm value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
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