التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: |
Speculative Taint Tracking (STT): A Comprehensive Protection for Speculatively Accessed Data. |
المؤلفون: |
Jiyong Yu, Mengjia Yan, Khyzha, Artem, Morrison, Adam, Torrellas, Josep, Fletcher, Christopher W. |
المصدر: |
Communications of the ACM; Dec2021, Vol. 64 Issue 12, p105-112, 8p, 7 Diagrams, 1 Chart, 1 Graph |
مصطلحات موضوعية: |
COMPUTER security, DATA protection, MALWARE prevention, COMPUTER architecture, COMPUTER performance |
مستخلص: |
Speculative execution attacks present an enormous security threat, capable of reading arbitrary program data under malicious speculation, and later exfiltrating that data over microarchitectural covert channels. This paper proposes speculative taint tracking (STT), a high security and high performance hardware mechanism to block these attacks. The main idea is that it is safe to execute and selectively forward the results of speculative instructions that read secrets, as long as we can prove that the forwarded results do not reach potential covert channels. The technical core of the paper is a new abstraction to help identify all microarchitectural covert channels, and an architecture to quickly identify when a covert channel is no longer a threat. We further conduct a detailed formal analysis on the scheme in a companion document. When evaluated on SPEC06 workloads, STT incurs 8.5% or 14.5% performance overhead relative to an insecure machine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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قاعدة البيانات: |
Complementary Index |