التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Sovereign Collateral. |
| المؤلفون: |
Flandreau, Marc, Pietrosanti, Stefano, Schuster, Carlotta E. |
| المصدر: |
Journal of Economic History; Mar2024, Vol. 84 Issue 1, p191-231, 41p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
PUBLIC debts, FINANCIAL institutions, COLLATERAL security, LAW firms, LIENS |
| مستخلص: |
Due to a dearth of data, nineteenth century lending to sovereign borrowers was a blind date. We argue this is the reason for collateral pledges found in contemporary lending covenants, which enabled not execution, but the production of reliable fiscal data. Lawyers injected collateral clauses in sovereign debt covenants to permit credible disclosure of hard-to-access tax data. The study foregrounds the importance of big law firms as financial intermediaries and information producers. It also contributes a new view on the role played by contracts in sovereign debt. "No [underwriting] firm can take precautions against the repudiation of a [sovereign] hypothecation." —Thomas Baring, 1865 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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| قاعدة البيانات: |
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