التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Audit committee cash compensation and related-party transactions: the role of directors' affiliation. |
| المؤلفون: |
Alkebsee, Radwan, Alhebry, Adeeb A., Tiron-Tudor, Adriana, Gubara, Gubara Farah, Alsayegh, Abdulkarim |
| المصدر: |
Managerial Auditing Journal; 2024, Vol. 39 Issue 5, p522-544, 23p |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: |
RELATED party transactions, AUDIT committees, GRANGER causality test, GENERALIZED method of moments, INVESTORS, FINANCE, CASH transactions |
| مستخلص: |
Purpose: This paper aims to investigate the relationship between the audit committee's (AC) cash compensation and related-party transactions (RPTs). This paper also explores whether the affiliation of directors on the AC has a differential effect on the association between AC members' cash compensation and RPTs. Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses data from Chinese-listed firms for the period from 2007 to 2017 and use the ordinary least square regressions, to test the association between AC cash compensation and RPTs. To alleviate the endogeneity concerns, this paper applies the generalized method of moment, the two-stage least square regression technique and the Granger causality test. Findings: This paper documents a negative association between the AC members' cash compensation and RPTs. The findings reveal that one standard deviation increase in the AC's cash compensation leads to around 0.08% reduction in the amount of RPTs. Further analysis shows that the cash compensation of AC independent directors is negatively associated with RPTs, whereas that of nonindependent directors shows no significant impact. The results remain robust to endogeneity tests. The results might be of interest to both practitioners as well as regulatory bodies and investors. Originality/value: To the best of the authors' knowledge, this study is the first to try to examine the relationship between AC cash compensation and RPTs in the context of China. This study also is the first attempt to consider the affiliation of AC directors by decomposing the AC compensation into independent and nonindependent directors. Also, it adds to the literature on the determinants of RPTs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
|
Copyright of Managerial Auditing Journal is the property of Emerald Publishing Limited and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.) |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
Complementary Index |
Full Text Finder