Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems
العنوان: | Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems |
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المؤلفون: | David J. Kusterer, Gary E. Bolton, Johannes Mans |
المصدر: | Management Science. 65:5371-5391 |
بيانات النشر: | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2019. |
سنة النشر: | 2019 |
مصطلحات موضوعية: | 050208 finance, Reputation information, Actuarial science, Electronic markets, Strategy and Management, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Experimental economics, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Reputation, media_common |
الوصف: | The reputation information provided by market feedback systems tends to be compressed in the sense that reliable and unreliable sellers have similar feedback scores. The experiment presented here features a market in which what a buyer receives is a noisy signal of what was actually sent. We focus on the influence the noise has on endogenously given feedback. The attributional uncertainty creates room for leniency in feedback giving. We find that buyer leniency reduces the informativeness of the feedback system and, in combination with uncertainty, diminishes seller trustworthiness. With a noisy signal, buyers pay about the same prices but get significantly less. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics. |
تدمد: | 1526-5501 0025-1909 |
URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::525df899a2f36c1398779466d559d24a https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3191 |
رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi...........525df899a2f36c1398779466d559d24a |
قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
تدمد: | 15265501 00251909 |
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