Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Inflated Reputations: Uncertainty, Leniency, and Moral Wiggle Room in Trader Feedback Systems
المؤلفون: David J. Kusterer, Gary E. Bolton, Johannes Mans
المصدر: Management Science. 65:5371-5391
بيانات النشر: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2019.
سنة النشر: 2019
مصطلحات موضوعية: 050208 finance, Reputation information, Actuarial science, Electronic markets, Strategy and Management, media_common.quotation_subject, 05 social sciences, Management Science and Operations Research, Experimental economics, Microeconomics, 0502 economics and business, Economics, 050207 economics, Reputation, media_common
الوصف: The reputation information provided by market feedback systems tends to be compressed in the sense that reliable and unreliable sellers have similar feedback scores. The experiment presented here features a market in which what a buyer receives is a noisy signal of what was actually sent. We focus on the influence the noise has on endogenously given feedback. The attributional uncertainty creates room for leniency in feedback giving. We find that buyer leniency reduces the informativeness of the feedback system and, in combination with uncertainty, diminishes seller trustworthiness. With a noisy signal, buyers pay about the same prices but get significantly less. This paper was accepted by Uri Gneezy, behavioral economics.
تدمد: 1526-5501
0025-1909
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::525df899a2f36c1398779466d559d24a
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3191
رقم الأكسشن: edsair.doi...........525df899a2f36c1398779466d559d24a
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE