Do Informal Contracts Matter for Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Social Capital
| العنوان: | Do Informal Contracts Matter for Corporate Innovation? Evidence from Social Capital |
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| المؤلفون: | Kartik Raman, Atul Gupta, Chenguang Shang |
| المصدر: | Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 55:1657-1684 |
| بيانات النشر: | Cambridge University Press (CUP), 2019. |
| سنة النشر: | 2019 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Economics and Econometrics, Labour economics, 050208 finance, 05 social sciences, Face (sociological concept), Corporate innovation, Information asymmetry, Accounting, 0502 economics and business, Relevance (law), Business, 050207 economics, Finance, Labor union, Social capital |
| الوصف: | We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation. |
| تدمد: | 1756-6916 0022-1090 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7d0bfb173da317ea478eedec1092d358 https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109019000498 |
| حقوق: | CLOSED |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi...........7d0bfb173da317ea478eedec1092d358 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 17566916 00221090 |
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