Do Binding Beat Nonbinding Agreements? Regulating International Water Quality
| العنوان: | Do Binding Beat Nonbinding Agreements? Regulating International Water Quality |
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| المؤلفون: | Martin Köppel, Detlef F. Sprinz |
| المصدر: | Journal of Conflict Resolution. 63:1860-1888 |
| بيانات النشر: | SAGE Publications, 2019. |
| سنة النشر: | 2019 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Sociology and Political Science, 05 social sciences, Political Science and International Relations, 050602 political science & public administration, 010501 environmental sciences, 01 natural sciences, General Business, Management and Accounting, 0506 political science, 0105 earth and related environmental sciences |
| الوصف: | Does the form of a multilateral agreement (MEA) by itself improve environmental performance? In particular, do legally nonbinding MEAs pose a rival to the effect of more traditional legally binding international agreements? Our theory builds on the legal and international regimes literatures and postulates that legally binding agreements (LBAs) have more benign effects on water quality than legally nonbinding agreements (LNBAs). We probe two operationalizations of the form of MEAs. First, we purely focus on the form: of legally binding versus legally nonbindings. Second, we combine the form of an agreement each with an index of precision and an index of delegation. The empirical focus is on upstream–downstream water quality in Europe during 1990 to 2007. Our regression analyses, regardless of specification, find that LBAs beat LNBAs and that LBAs with high degrees of precision and delegation beat the effect of any other configuration of agreements with respect to enhancing water quality. |
| تدمد: | 1552-8766 0022-0027 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a6bfef9a9b80b57e8fa7dd06eee64ddc https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002718822127 |
| حقوق: | CLOSED |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi...........a6bfef9a9b80b57e8fa7dd06eee64ddc |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 15528766 00220027 |
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