Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Modeling Resources in Permissionless Longest-Chain Total-Order Broadcast
المؤلفون: Azouvi, Sarah, Cachin, Christian, Le, Duc V., Vukolić, Marko, Zanolini, Luca
بيانات النشر: Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, 2023.
سنة النشر: 2023
مصطلحات موضوعية: FOS: Computer and information sciences, blockchain, Computer Science - Cryptography and Security, 510 Mathematics, Computer Science - Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing, consensus, Software and its engineering → Distributed systems organizing principles, Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC), resource, Cryptography and Security (cs.CR), broadcast, 000 Computer science, knowledge & systems, Theory of computation → Cryptographic protocols
الوصف: Blockchain protocols implement total-order broadcast in a permissionless setting, where processes can freely join and leave. In such a setting, to safeguard against Sybil attacks, correct processes rely on cryptographic proofs tied to a particular type of resource to make them eligible to order transactions. For example, in the case of Proof-of-Work (PoW), this resource is computation, and the proof is a solution to a computationally hard puzzle. Conversely, in Proof-of-Stake (PoS), the resource corresponds to the number of coins that every process in the system owns, and a secure lottery selects a process for participation proportionally to its coin holdings. Although many resource-based blockchain protocols are formally proven secure in the literature, the existing security proofs fail to demonstrate why particular types of resources cause the blockchain protocols to be vulnerable to distinct classes of attacks. For instance, PoS systems are more vulnerable to long-range attacks, where an adversary corrupts past processes to re-write the history, than PoW and Proof-of-Storage systems. Proof-of-Storage-based and PoS-based protocols are both more susceptible to private double-spending attacks than PoW-based protocols; in this case, an adversary mines its chain in secret without sharing its blocks with the rest of the processes until the end of the attack. In this paper, we formally characterize the properties of resources through an abstraction called resource allocator and give a framework for understanding longest-chain consensus protocols based on different underlying resources. In addition, we use this resource allocator to demonstrate security trade-offs between various resources focusing on well-known attacks (e.g., the long-range attack and nothing-at-stake attacks).
LIPIcs, Vol. 253, 26th International Conference on Principles of Distributed Systems (OPODIS 2022), pages 19:1-19:23
اللغة: English
DOI: 10.4230/lipics.opodis.2022.19
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::241c7588176aa81af059da100e32e150
حقوق: OPEN
رقم الأكسشن: edsair.doi.dedup.....241c7588176aa81af059da100e32e150
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE
الوصف
DOI:10.4230/lipics.opodis.2022.19