Trust in Procurement Interactions
| العنوان: | Trust in Procurement Interactions |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Elena Katok, Nicolas Fugger, Achim Wambach |
| المصدر: | Management Science. 65:5110-5127 |
| بيانات النشر: | Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2019. |
| سنة النشر: | 2019 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | 050208 finance, Behavioral game theory, Strategy and Management, 05 social sciences, TheoryofComputation_GENERAL, Management Science and Operations Research, Experimental economics, Reverse auction, Procurement, 0502 economics and business, ddc:330, ComputingMilieux_COMPUTERSANDSOCIETY, D02, D03, Business, 050207 economics, Industrial organization, D44 |
| الوصف: | When complex procurement projects are conducted, it is often not possible to write complete contracts. As a consequence, the relationship between buyer and supplier is important for the success of the project. In this paper we investigate the claim that auctions in procurement can be detrimental for the buyer–supplier relationship, which is in line with the observation that reverse auctions are less frequently conducted if projects are complex. A poor relationship can result in a decrease in trust on the part of the buyer during the sourcing process and an increase in the supplier’s opportunistic behavior following sourcing. We consider a setting in which the winning supplier decides on the level of quality to provide to the buyer, and we compare a standard reverse auction and a buyer-determined reverse auction, both analytically and in the laboratory. We find that the buyer-determined reverse auction can perform better than the standard reverse auction from both the buyer’s and the suppliers’ perspective. In a buyer-determined reverse auction, it may be optimal for the buyer to select the supplier who submitted a higher bid, which may in turn induce this supplier to deliver higher quality. Standard auctions, however, yield lower prices but reduce cooperation. The degree of trust, as reflected by a larger number of transactions and a higher average efficiency of trade, is significantly higher in buyer-determined reverse auctions. Theoretical reasoning based on other-regarding preferences organizes our data well. This paper was accepted by Serguei Netessine, operations management. |
| تدمد: | 1526-5501 0025-1909 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5a780ad290599ec461ea7a5135bccfa1 https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3196 |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi.dedup.....5a780ad290599ec461ea7a5135bccfa1 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 15265501 00251909 |
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