Casting Conference Calls

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Casting Conference Calls
المؤلفون: Christopher J. Malloy, Dong Lou, Lauren Cohen
المصدر: Management Science. 66:5015-5039
بيانات النشر: Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 2020.
سنة النشر: 2020
مصطلحات موضوعية: 050208 finance, HD28 Management. Industrial Management, Strategy and Management, education, 05 social sciences, Control (management), 050201 accounting, Management Science and Operations Research, Casting (metalworking), 0502 economics and business, Capital asset pricing model, Business, Information flow (information theory), health care economics and organizations, Mechanism (sociology), Industrial organization
الوصف: We explore a subtle but important mechanism through which firms can control information flow to the markets. We find that firms that “cast” their conference calls by disproportionately calling on bullish analysts tend to underperform in the future. Firms that call on more favorable analysts experience more negative future earnings surprises and more future earnings restatements. A long–short portfolio that exploits this differential firm behavior earns abnormal returns of up to 149 basis points per month or almost 18% per year. We find similar evidence in an international sample of earnings call transcripts from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, and Japan. Firms with higher discretionary accruals, firms that barely meet/exceed earnings expectations, and firms (and their executives) that are about to issue equity, sell shares, and exercise options are all significantly more likely to cast their earnings calls. This paper was accepted by Tyler Shumway, finance.
وصف الملف: text
تدمد: 1526-5501
0025-1909
URL الوصول: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6d08e2f4aead7b53741d0cc1d06f7574
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3423
حقوق: OPEN
رقم الأكسشن: edsair.doi.dedup.....6d08e2f4aead7b53741d0cc1d06f7574
قاعدة البيانات: OpenAIRE