Paradigms, possibilities, and probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016)
| العنوان: | Paradigms, possibilities, and probabilities: Comment on Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016) |
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| المؤلفون: | Nicole Cruz, Mike Oaksford, David E. Over |
| المصدر: | Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 45:288-297 |
| بيانات النشر: | American Psychological Association (APA), 2019. |
| سنة النشر: | 2019 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Linguistics and Language, Logic, Logical reasoning, Concept Formation, 05 social sciences, Mental model, Probabilistic logic, Experimental and Cognitive Psychology, PsycINFO, Thinking skills, 050105 experimental psychology, Language and Linguistics, Rendering (computer graphics), Thinking, Modal, Concept learning, Humans, 0501 psychology and cognitive sciences, Psychology, Mathematical economics, Problem Solving, Probability |
| الوصف: | Hinterecker, Knauff, and Johnson-Laird (2016) compared the adequacy of the probabilistic new paradigm in reasoning with the recent revision of mental models theory (MMT) for explaining a novel class of inferences containing the modal term "possibly." For example, the door is closed or the window is open or both, therefore, possibly the door is closed and the window is open (A or B or both, therefore, possibly(A & B)). They concluded that their results support MMT. In this comment, it is argued that Hinterecker et al. (2016) have not adequately characterized the theory of probabilistic validity (p-validity) on which the new paradigm depends. It is unclear how p-validity can be applied to these inferences, which are anyway peripheral to the theory. It is also argued that the revision of MMT is not well motivated and its adoption leads to many logical absurdities. Moreover, the comparison is not appropriate because these theories are defined at different levels of computational explanation. In particular, revised MMT lacks a provably consistent computational level theory that could justify treating these inferences as valid. It is further argued that the data could result from the noncolloquial locutions used to express the premises. Finally, an alternative pragmatic account is proposed based on the idea that a conclusion is possible if what someone knows cannot rule it out. This account could be applied to the unrevised mental model theory rendering the revision redundant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved). |
| تدمد: | 1939-1285 0278-7393 |
| URL الوصول: | https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a4c4e7ef2d0a3e5d9cd0ef4dfad8a7b6 https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000586 |
| حقوق: | OPEN |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsair.doi.dedup.....a4c4e7ef2d0a3e5d9cd0ef4dfad8a7b6 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OpenAIRE |
| تدمد: | 19391285 02787393 |
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