تقرير
Security Analysis of Measurement-device-independent Quantum Secure Direct Communication
| العنوان: | Security Analysis of Measurement-device-independent Quantum Secure Direct Communication |
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| المؤلفون: | Niu, Peng-Hao, Wu, Jia-Wei, Yin, Liu-Guo, Long, Gui-Lu |
| سنة النشر: | 2020 |
| المجموعة: | Quantum Physics |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Quantum Physics |
| الوصف: | Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) is an important branch of quantum communication that transmits confidential message directly in a quantum channel without utilizing encryption and decryption. It not only prevents eavesdropping during transmission, but also eliminates the security loophole associated with key storage and management. Recently measurement-device-independent (MDI) QSDC protocols in which the measurement is performed by an untrusted party using imperfect measurement devices have been constructed, and MDI-QSDC eliminates the security loopholes originating from the imperfections in measurement devices so that enable application of QSDC with current technology. In this paper, we complete the quantitative security analysis of the MDI-QSDC. The security capacity is derived, and its lower bound is given. It is found that the MDI-QSDC secrecy capacity is only slightly lower than that of QSDC utilizing perfect measurement devices. Therefore QSDC is possible with current measurement devices by sacrificing a small amount in the capacity. Comment: This work was submitted to Phys. Rev. A on Feb. 3, 2020 with code number AP11817. In this paper a security loophole in "Sci Bull 2018, 63: 1345-1350" about the cover operations performed by Bob was fixed. This security loophole is also fixed up by a recent paper arXiv: 2006.05263v1 |
| نوع الوثيقة: | Working Paper |
| URL الوصول: | http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.07184 |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsarx.2006.07184 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | arXiv |
| الوصف غير متاح. |