Underreaction and dynamic inconsistency in communication games under noise

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Underreaction and dynamic inconsistency in communication games under noise
المؤلفون: Bauch, Gerrit
سنة النشر: 2023
مصطلحات موضوعية: Economics - Theoretical Economics
الوصف: Communication is rarely perfect, but rather prone to error of transmission and reception. Often the origin of these errors cannot be properly quantified and is thus imprecisely known. We analyze the impact of an ambiguous noise which may alter the received message on a communication game of common interest. The noise is ambiguous in the sense that the parameters of the error-generating process and thus the likelihood to receive a message by mistake are Knightianly unknown. Ex-ante and interim responses are characterized under maxmin preferences. While the sender can disregard ambiguity, the receiver reveals a dynamically inconsistent, but astonishing behavior under a quadratic loss. Their interim actions will be closer to the pooling action than their ex-ante ones, as if facing a higher likelihood of an occurring error.
نوع الوثيقة: Working Paper
URL الوصول: http://arxiv.org/abs/2311.12496
رقم الأكسشن: edsarx.2311.12496
قاعدة البيانات: arXiv