Combinatorics on Social Configurations

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Combinatorics on Social Configurations
المؤلفون: Mermoud, Dylan Laplace, Popoli, Pierre
المصدر: EPTCS 403, 2024, pp. 128-133
سنة النشر: 2024
المجموعة: Computer Science
مصطلحات موضوعية: Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory, Computer Science - Discrete Mathematics
الوصف: In cooperative game theory, the social configurations of players are modeled by balanced collections. The Bondareva-Shapley theorem, perhaps the most fundamental theorem in cooperative game theory, characterizes the existence of solutions to the game that benefit everyone using balanced collections. Roughly speaking, if the trivial set system of all players is one of the most efficient balanced collections for the game, then the set of solutions from which each coalition benefits, the so-called core, is non-empty. In this paper, we discuss some interactions between combinatorics and cooperative game theory that are still relatively unexplored. Indeed, the similarity between balanced collections and uniform hypergraphs seems to be a relevant point of view to obtain new properties on those collections through the theory of combinatorial species.
Comment: In Proceedings GASCom 2024, arXiv:2406.14588
نوع الوثيقة: Working Paper
DOI: 10.4204/EPTCS.403.27
URL الوصول: http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.16409
رقم الأكسشن: edsarx.2406.16409
قاعدة البيانات: arXiv