مورد إلكتروني

Discrediting Egoism: a Substitute for the Holy Grail

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Discrediting Egoism: a Substitute for the Holy Grail
عناروين إضافية: Discrediting Egoism: a Substitute for the Holy Grail
المصدر: Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 46 No. 1 (2021); 173-189; Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 46 Núm. 1 (2021); 173-189; Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 46 N.º 1 (2021); 173-189; 1988-284X; 0034-8244
بيانات النشر: Ediciones Complutense 2021-04-29
تفاصيل مُضافة: Sanford, Jawara
نوع الوثيقة: Electronic Resource
مستخلص: A knock-down argument against egoism has been considered to be the Holy Grail of moral philosophy. With the conviction that it is quixotic at best to seek out this Holy Grail by attempting yet again to refute egoism on its own terms, I pursue the more modest goal of roundly discrediting egoism. To show just how implausible this theory is, I set forth a cumulative set of arguments that appeal to virtually universal normative judgments and features of moral phenomenology.
Un argumento incontestable contra el egoísmo ha sido considerado como el santo grial de la filosofía moral, es decir, una meta muy valiosa pero de muy difícil realización. Convencido de que sería como mínimo quijotesco volver a intentar una vez más refutar el egoísmo sobre la base de sus propios supuestos, persigo la meta más modesta de desacreditar el egoísmo de forma contundente. Para mostrar hasta qué punto esta teoría es inverosímil, expongo una combinación de argumentos que apelan a juicios normativos y rasgos de nuestra fenomenología moral casi universales.
مصطلحات الفهرس: rational egoism, ethical egoism, egoism, rationality, selfishness, egoísmo racional, egoísmo ético, egoísmo, racionalidad, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, Artículo revisado por pares
URL: https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/65447
https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/65447/4564456557043
https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/65447/4564456557043
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الإتاحة: Open access content. Open access content
Derechos de autor 2021 Revista de Filosofía
ملاحظة: application/pdf
Revista de Filosofía; Vol. 46 No. 1 (2021); 173-189
English
أرقام أخرى: S9M oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/65447
https://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/RESF/article/view/65447
1252415781
المصدر المساهم: UNIV COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID
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