مورد إلكتروني
Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence
| العنوان: | Can exit prizes induce lame ducks to shirk less? Experimental evidence |
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| المصدر: | European Journal of Government and Economics; Vol. 1 No. 2 (2012); 106-125; 2254-7088 |
| بيانات النشر: | Europa Grande 2012-12-31 |
| تفاصيل مُضافة: | Helland, Leif Hovi, Jon Monkerud, Lars |
| نوع الوثيقة: | Electronic Resource |
| مستخلص: | Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects. |
| مصطلحات الفهرس: | overlapping generations, last period effects, legislatures, C7, C9, H4, info:eu-repo/semantics/article, info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion, Peer-reviewed Article |
| URL: | |
| الإتاحة: | Open access content. Open access content Copyright (c) 2012 Leif Helland, Jon Hovi, Lars Monkerud |
| ملاحظة: | application/pdf English |
| أرقام أخرى: | ESEUR oai:ojs2.journals.eurosci.net:article/13 1362406646 |
| المصدر المساهم: | EUROPA GRANDE From OAIster®, provided by the OCLC Cooperative. |
| رقم الأكسشن: | edsoai.on1362406646 |
| قاعدة البيانات: | OAIster |
| الوصف غير متاح. |