التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
| العنوان: |
Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation |
| المؤلفون: |
Andrew Ellul, Cong Wang, Kuo Zhang |
| المصدر: |
INFORMS, Management Science. 70(2):885-906 |
| سنة النشر: |
2024 |
| الوصف: |
Unemployment risk influences workers’ incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. This paper investigates the impact of unemployment risk on chief executive officers (CEOs)’ risk-taking incentive compensation. Exploiting state-level changes in unemployment benefits, we find that after unemployment insurance benefits become more generous, boards increase the convex payoff structure of CEO pay to encourage risk taking. The increase in CEOs’ convexity payoff is stronger in firms with more independent and diverse boards, higher ownership of long-term shareholders, and in industries requiring highly skilled labor. Our findings suggest that boards internalize workers’ interests in firms’ risk-taking decisions and executive compensation is one mechanism used. |
| نوع الوثيقة: |
redif-article |
| اللغة: |
English |
| DOI: |
10.1287/mnsc.2023.4714 |
| الإتاحة: |
https://ideas.repec.org/a/inm/ormnsc/v70y2024i2p885-906.html |
| رقم الأكسشن: |
edsrep.a.inm.ormnsc.v70y2024i2p885.906 |
| قاعدة البيانات: |
RePEc |
