Simple equilibria in general contests
| العنوان: | Simple equilibria in general contests |
|---|---|
| المؤلفون: | Bastani, Spencer, Docent, 1982, Giebe, Thomas, Dr, Gürtler, Oliver |
| المصدر: | Games and Economic Behavior. 134:264-280 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | Contest theory, Symmetric equilibrium, Heterogeneity, Risk, Stochastic dominance, Economics, Nationalekonomi |
| الوصف: | We show how symmetric equilibria emerge in general two-player contests in which skill and effort are combined to produce output according to a general production technology and players have skills drawn from different distributions. The model includes the Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981) models as special cases. Our paper provides intuition regarding how the contest components interact to determine the incentive to exert effort and sheds new light on classic comparative statics results. In particular, we show that more heterogeneity can increase equilibrium effort. |
| وصف الملف: | electronic |
| URL الوصول: | https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-113100 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.006 https://lnu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1661604/FULLTEXT01.pdf |
| قاعدة البيانات: | SwePub |
| تدمد: | 08998256 |
|---|---|
| DOI: | 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.006 |