Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
العنوان: Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis
المؤلفون: Båve, Arvid
المصدر: Philosophia. 47(5):1421-1429
مصطلحات موضوعية: Truth, Prosentential, Grover, Belnap, Brandom, Salis, Anaphor, Pronoun
الوصف: I here respond to Pietro Salis's objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and general semantic notions like equivalence, consequence, and sameness of content, and make some further points about (PT)'s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of true.
وصف الملف: print
URL الوصول: https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-176584
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9
قاعدة البيانات: SwePub
الوصف
تدمد:00483893
15749274
DOI:10.1007/s11406-019-00081-9