Implicating fictional truth
| العنوان: | Implicating fictional truth |
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| المؤلفون: | Franzén, Nils, 1987 |
| المصدر: | Philosophical Studies. 181(1):299-317 |
| مصطلحات موضوعية: | David lewis, Fictionality, Kathleen stock, Stacie friend, The reality principle, Truth in fiction |
| الوصف: | Some things that we take to be the case in a fictional work are never made explicit by the work itself. For instance, we assume that Sherlock Holmes does not have a third nostril, that he wears underpants and that he has never solved a case with a purple gnome, even though neither of these things is ever mentioned in the narration. This article argues that examples like these can be accounted for through the same content-enriching reasoning that we employ when confronted with non-fictional discourse, with the important difference that fictional discourse essentially involves pretence. Fictional discourse works in much the same way as non-fictional discourse, and what is conveyed without being stated can accordingly be explained through familiar pragmatic mechanisms. It is argued that this account carries some distinct advantages over competing views. |
| وصف الملف: | electronic |
| URL الوصول: | https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-218535 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02087-2 https://umu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1821660/FULLTEXT02.pdf |
| قاعدة البيانات: | SwePub |
Find this article in full text from Springer Verlag. | تدمد: | 00318116 |
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| DOI: | 10.1007/s11098-023-02087-2 |