Göteborgs universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori, Gothenburg University, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science
المصدر:
The Routledge handbook of metaethics / edited by Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett.. :275-291
This chapter has two sections, each focusing on a distinct way in which ethical disagreement and variations in ethical judgment matter for theories of ethical thought and talk. In the first section, we look at how the variation poses problems for both cognitivist and non-cognitivist ways of specifying the nature of ethical judgments. In the second, we look at how disagreement phenomena have been taken to undermine cognitivist accounts, but also at how the seeming variation in cognitive and non-cognitive contents between parties of deep ethical disagreement challenges both cognitivist and non-cognitivist accounts of disagreement itself.
